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L\ITII AT TilE INTERSECTION OF HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE 
theologi~1I1~» to Join the conversation, to ask whether he, too, has anything 
10 say to LIS toda)/ 
2 
Geschichte und Historie 
The Problem afFaith and Hi5tary 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GESCf-/ICHTE AND /-/lSTORIL 
The historical consciousness of the nineteenth century created new prob­
lems for Protestant theology: how may the new historical science be a11 ­
plied to the Bible? How is faith to maintain its assurance ill the midst 
of historical uncertainty?' These questions only intensitled when posed 
with regard to the biblical witness to Jesus Christ and to Christian faith 
in him. Already in the late nineteenth century, Martin K;ihler had at­
tempted to circumscribe a sturlllfreies Gebiet (literally a "storm-free are,n 
for Christian faith, an area into which the ambigUity and uncertainty of 
historical criticism could not and should not penetrate. Kahler attempted 
to secure this area by distinguishing between the historical Jesus and the 
historic Christ, betl-veen the biblical picture of Christ and the portr'lit 
provided by historical research. Others (e.g. Wilhelm Herrmann and 
Wilhelm I3ousset) sought to answer these same questions by other means. 
Their conclusions initiated a spirited discussion of the relationship be­
tween faith and history, between the Protestant prinCiple ofjustitlcation 
by faith alone and the modern science of historical research. 
In a 1911 essay entitled Geschichte und Historic in tier 
Religionswissenschaft,2 Georg Wobbermin revisited some of these ear­
1. For some general discussions of tht: problem of faith and hislory ill Ihe llinckCl1lh­
century, see Paulus, Colt in der Gesdlichte? Brachl1lJnn, Gh/libe lIIld Ge,dJlchte; IZohls, 
Pmte,tan/ische Theologie da Neuzeil, vol. I; Welch, Prote,talll 1110Jlghr in the Nineteellth 
Century; and HowJrd, Religion and the Ri,e o/l-li,lOricislII. For a mure general stuJy, s"" 
Harvey, The Historiall and the Believer. 
2. Wobbermin, Geschichte ~Jllil Historie in cia Rdigic.JI1slVissellschajt. 
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Iier Jllell1l11S and 'lrgued for tbe use of a stricter, conceptual distinction 
between C"sL'/licl/1I: Jnd I-!ist{)l'ic: in order to clarify faith's relationship 
to Jesus Christ in light of modern historical consciousness, This essay 
W;l$ prompted in part by Ihe recent publication of Arthur Drews's Die 
CllristllSlIlytl/(.:,' in which Drews provocatively suggested that a "histori­
c;ll" jesus or NaL<lI'eth never existed, Drews's radical conclusions sparked 
inknse dehate in (;erman theological circles and pointedly raised the 
question or the rel;\ti()nshi~l hetween faith and historical knowledge as a 
question or u:nlr,ll significance for Protestant theology 
l\ A, (;errish sketches the contours of the Christ-Myth debate 
sparked hy Drews's hook in an article on Ernst Troeltsch's stand in the 
deb,lle, (;c:rrish suggests that Drews's thesis was provocative, perhaps 
even absurd, hut nonetheless important because it invited theologians to 
reflect anew 011 Ihe question of faith and history, to ask the specific ques­
lion olthe relev;lnce of the historical Jesus for faith' 
In his study of C;t:sc!-ticJlte and Historie, vVobbermin accuses Drews 
of ignoring the real and necessary distinction between the active and ef­
ficacious picture of Christ within the Christian tradition on the one hand 
and the results of historical criticism of that same tradition on the other­
Drews railed to distinguish, in Wobhermin's terms, between the merely 
historical Ihli~/3 flistol'iscfl] and the immediately historic [unmittelbar 
gf!sl'ilidillidd,; By fai ling to make th is important distinction, Drews did 
not t,lke account of the distinction between the historical Jesus behind 
the New Testamenl, of whom very little can be known, and the picture 
01" Christ found in the New Testament and in the Christian tradition 
through to lhe present day­
,3. In the (ore'''"ld tll Ihe first and second eJitions Drews aJJresses the aims of this 
w"rk: "'thi, tc~t seeks to pruduce evidence that pretly much every trail of the picture of 
the his(llrical Jesus, ,II least every imporlant trait of religiOUS significance, has a purely 
mythical char,lCter anJ Ihere e~ists no reason at all to seek a historicalligure behind the 
'Christ Myth:" Drews, Di~ Christl/smyth", xiii-xiv [ET (of the thirJ German edition): Th" 
Cllrist 1\.1)'£1/, 191, He reservcs specific crilicism f'Jr tile representatives of liberal theology: 
"It is in fael the fundamelltal error l1f lib~ral Iheology to think that the development of 
the Christian church has IssueJ (rum a histurical inJiviJual - th~ man Jesus:' Ibid" 225 
IEI',285-86\. 
~, See Cerrish, "jesus, iVlyth, anJ Histor),H 
5, Wohbcrl11ill, Gesdlicl/te lilld Nis[urie, 2, 
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Drews did, in fact, acknowledge sLich a distinClion, but he concluded 
that the distinction was irrelevant and that it only attempted 10 ignore the 
problematical character of Christianity's claim to a historic fOLindat ion: 
The reference to history and the so-called "histori-:al continuity of 
religious development" is obviously only a way out of ,I dillicu!ty, 
, , As if there can still be talk of a "historic basis" where lhere 
is no history, but pure myth l As if the "preservation or' histori­
cal contilluity" could cOllsist in maintaining as history wh.1I are 
mythical fictions, just because to thiS point they have p;1ssed fill 
hislorical truth, when we have seen through their purel)' lictitiouS 
and unreal character!O 
Nevertheless, Wobbermin insists that a conceptual distinetir)n be­
tween Geschichle and Historie will clarify the probleln that Drews raised 
with such force, It is precisely to avoid throwing the historic picture of 
Christ out with the historically murky bathwater that leads Wobhel'lnill 
to make a stricter distinction between Geschichte and Historie, 
As with any conceptual distinction, it is important to define the terms 
as clearly and precisely as possible, In this particular case it is doubly im­
portant, because, as Wobbermin candidly adl1lits, such a distinction is an 
arbitrary one? lne terms Geschichte and Historie (and the correspond­
ing adjectives and adverbs geschichtlich and historiscll) call be used in­
terchangeably in most contexts with little wnfusion, Such an arhitrary 
distinction can be justified and even demanded, in Wobbermin's opinion, 
if it can be shown to provide tangible methodological benefits, such as 
clarifying conceptual problems,S '1ne test of such an arbitrary distinction 
is finally answered in the application of the distinction itself: will such a 
distinction prove useful for theological work? If the anSlver is yes, then 
such a distinction is justified, If no, then it must be abandoned in favor of 
a more effective conceptual tool, 
6, Drews, Die Christl/smythe, 232 rET: The Christ Myth, 293-941, 
7, The arbitrariness of the distinction between Geschichte anJ fJistorie was not k'st 
on l11an)' contemporar)' commentators, most notabl), Albert Schweitzer, who warned 
that Wobbermin had ventureJ onto "Jangerous grounJ" wilh his insistellce Oil a slricler 
distinction between the two terms: "He forfeits everylhing by executing his idca wilh a 
play of artful distinctions, Nothing is hdpeJ by this, What is e~~enlial above all Ihillgs is 
lhallheology employ clear language, Let your speech be ),es, )'es; IIU, no, An)'lhing 1I1llre 
is of the Evil One:' Schweitzer, Geschichte der Lebel1-Jesli-ForscJ"'I/I~, 521 IET: The Qliest 
of the fJistorica/ Jeslis, 408], 
R Wobbermin, Geschichte lind flistorie, 4, 
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II is important to nole here that vVohherl11in did not invent the dis­
tinctiLln hetween (;t:schil"!Jtt: and f-listorit:; Martin Kahler employed a sim­
ilar distinLlion in his critique of the nineteenth-century "Lives ofJesus:'~ 
Kiihler, however, did nol attempt 10 arrive at a systematic or conceptual 
understanding of the distinction between these terms. 111e distinction 
remained for him an auxiliary conceptual aid, but it is Wobbermin 
who elevates the distinclion to the status of a syslematic principle, and 
Wohhermin uses lhe distinction to clarify the 1110st basic questions ad­
dressed in his work. 
Despite the arhitl'al'iness of the distinction between Geschichte and 
llisloric, Wohherl11in attempts to prOVide precise definitions of both terms 
fur the purpose of conceplual clarity. Because he intends to employ the 
dislinLlioll as ~l systematic prinCiple and not merely as an auxiliary tool, 
he must be ~lS precise as pOSSible in clarifying the meaning of his terms 
,lilt! their interrelation. 
-fhrougllOut his essay, Wobhermin continues to refine his definition 
l)f Gt:schic!IIt:, so thai there are finally three distinct yet interrelated defini­
tions, n'lmcly, Gt:schichte as what has happened in the past, Geschichte as 
lhe realm of erJic,lcy or influence, and Geschicltte as the interrelation of 
human hcings as spirilual-moral beings in their development. 
The most b'lSic detinition of Geschichte is simply "what has hap­
penni" [IV"S isl gt:sc!lL:hell or IVUS gescJlilh]. Any event that has happened 
in the Pdst tlr any figure who has existed in the past belongs to Geschichte 
and is d !jesdlidltlidlt; Emgllis or a geschichlliche GrojJe. Historie, by con­
trast, is ,1 n,lITllWCf, more precise concept, which Wobbermin defines as 
"investigated Ceschichle" [er!iJrschtt: Geschichte],10 meaning Geschichte 
investigated with Ihe scientitlc historical method according to the canons 
of 'lCademic historical research. Geschidltt: is simply given; Historie must 
be acquired by scientitlc investigation. 
'fhe gesdticittlich can potelltially confront anyone who stands within 
history as d historic subject; Historie is accessible only to those with the 
necessary scientific and intellectual tools to discover it. Geschichte is 
prior to F-lislorie dnti is a broader category.11 Many events and figures of 
lJ. See Ihe seLlt"" Oil I';ihkr bd"w. 
10. Wohbermlll, Ceithic!/te fillet Hislorie, 5. 
II. 'these tcrms presenl siglli!icanl Jifliculties when attempting to capture anJ COII­
vel' their Illealling in English. Uillike (~ermall. English has only olle nOUlI, "history:' allJ 
Oldy <lne "clver!>. "historically." Like Cerlllan, however, English Joes have t\"O aJjectives 
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Geschichte are lost forever to later generations who must rely on historical 
research to reconstruct the past. Historie depends on sources (texts 'lnd 
various artifacts) by which past events or tlgures might be reconstructed. 
Without these sources, geschichtlich events or figures threaten to disap­
pear forever. It is the task of the historian to discover and interpret texts 
or artifacts in order to reconstruct the past. But the absence of sources 
that would provide evidence for a past event or figure does not constitute 
final proof that such an event never happened or that such a r-igure never 
existed; it only means that such an event or tlgure cannot be reconstructed 
by historical research. 
Wobbermin further detlnes Geschicltte, however, in terms of influ­
ence and signitlcance, or what he often calls effect or efficacy [Wirkung or 
Wirksamkeit]. Past events or personalities are capable of intluencing the 
future beyond their mere historicity, even if their historicity is question­
able on purely historical-scientific grounds. 111is is especially important 
in terms of the person of Jesus of Nazareth, who on purely historical 
grounds is a shadovvy tlgure but who is also clearly a tlgure of profound 
historic significance, influence, and efficacy beyond his mere historicity. 
To put it more precisely, the efficacy of Jesus of Nazareth transcends the 
mere fact of his historical existence. It is precisely this distinction between 
mere historicity and protound historic efficacy and signitlcance that d 
strict distinction between Geschichte and Hislorie is meant to clarify. 
The realm of Historie is the realm of probabilit}!. Historians can de­
termine the probability of their research achieving an aCCurate picture 
of the past with relative certainty, but the results of scientific historic'll 
research always remain relative and hypothetical. Whatever certainty is 
gained by historical research is never absolute, but approaches only a 
higher or lower degree of probability. This is not to say, however, that 
that can be used to inJicate the Germ~n Jistinction. But these English terms, like their 
German counterparts, ~re usually useJ interchange~bly. Tr~nsJ~tors llf Iote ninetet'lllh­
and twentieth-century theology h~ve gener~lly agreeJ upon the use of Ihe English dJjec­
lives to correspond to the German ~djeclives. In most cases "historic,ll" corresponds 10 
"historisch" ~nJ "historic" corresponds to "geschichtlich," anJ that is how rh,,'se lerillS 
will be used in this study. See, e.g., Braalen, InlroJuction to The 50-celllt'cI l-/isloric,Ii 
Jeslls arid the Historic Biblical Christ, by Martin Kahler, 21; Reid, "Tr~nslator's Note:' in 
Troeltsch, The Absolute/less of Christianily, 2t; and Ashcraft, Rudolf BI/hl/Ullln, 35-3tl. 
H. Richard Niebuhr altempts to express the same Jistinction in English wilh the ternlS 
"inner history" anJ "ouler history:' or history as liveJ anJ history as seen. See Niebuhr, 
The Meaning of Revelation, 31-47. 
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(;eschie}lIl: oHers abs\)lule ccrtainty, or even necess<1rily a higher degree 
of probability th,1I1 I-fistor;e. If this were so, Wobbermin suggests, Historie 
would be an unnecessary nuisance and could be safely abandoned. In that 
case, Ihe gO'll would be a Iota I separation of Gesdlichte frol11 Historie. 12 
[)u t I his is not the C<lse, }-fistone se rves the vi ta I pu rpose of removi ng, 
,1$ t~lr' ,1S possible. the uncertainty of the historic tradition and replacing 
uncertainty wilh scientifically ensured results. Historie, as Wobbermin 
deline'S il, ere~'[s wcll-detlned boundaries around Ceschichte and enables 
gr,ldu,ltcd ,lcceplance of probability for the various data of the historic 
traditioll. '1 his leads him to deline IJistorie more precisely as "scien­
lifically claritied and rdined Geschichte."u According to this definition. 
llisloril: serves as a limiting and ordering principle, investigating the 
historic lr,ldit ion and presenting the results of its research as the highest 
possible levd \)1' prob'lbility. As such, Historie is ,1 vital theological tool 
,111L] pl'1YS ,1 necessary role within the Christian religion, precisely because 
Christi,1nity is ,1 historic religion. 
Christianity is a historic religion in at least three important respects. 
hrst, Christianity is a historic religion because it is based on the life and 
teachings 01' a historic ligure, Jesus Christ, in whom it apprehends the rev­
elation of Cod, Second, Christianity is a historic religion because it refers 
to a hist\lric docu ment, lhe New Testament, as the sou rce and norm for its 
theolngical ref1ection, Third, Christianity is a historic religion because it 
refers to its own history (biblical, liturgical, theological, etc) for guidance 
dnd for resolll'ces for its continued development. In order to isolate the 
truly historic elements within this long tradition, Wobbermin defends a 
rigorous application of the historical method to the Christian tradition, 
12. W()bb~rlll in, c;,:sLI,id,1<: wltl I-list()ri~, 6. 
13... ()i~ hijturi;c1I~ F"rsdllllIg diellt ja gerncle del1l Zweck, die Ullsicherheit del' ge­
;lhid,clicl'~11 (.It:/lerliLjcrllllg lIL1cil Miiglichkeil Zli hehebm lIl1d dllrch wissellschaftlich 
gesicllettc ~eslllt(/le ::11 LTsellell. Wellll es ,,150 die histori;che Forschllflg doch immer 
11111' 211 vVt,lir;cli~ill/ic.llkei(s,l'rtei/ell ZlI brillgell vallIag, SO k<ltll1 sich die Geschichte 
,lis so"h~. d.ll. lIaell tlnll Vorherigell die geschichtliche Ueberliej'emng, lIidlt iiber 
da; t'Jll'L.'111I d,..,. I,istoflsclien Wahr;cheilllid,keitsuetmchtlilIg IIlId Wahrscheildich­
keilsgeltill/g ahd'etl, SOli/tern sie 1111.1)1 1I0d, illIteI' diesel/I t'Jivelili verbleibell. Erst 
die I-lislune ahel)1 ues(illlllItL.' Bairke lIl1d Ge/liele da Geschichte all! die Hdhe 
WiS"i'lIsl:haILiidler VI'<i1lrsLheilIlichkeitsbetrachtL/ng Will ermogliclit dll/nit j'iir die einulnen 
Vc'Cell /111,1 Bescl/I/dteile der belrejle/lllell UeberlieJerungell eille II/lllllligfach llbgesillfte 
\,\J,dlrs"lieill/icl,keitsgeltllllg. Die Historie isl <lIsa il'lsoweit die wissellschaftlich geklarte l/Ild 
gereilligte G';;;fliid't,; - G,;schichte Iliill/licli iln Sillne Jer Gest'h;chtsiiberlie/erung:' lhid. 
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Here Wobbermin wants to draw a further distinction between the 
historic tradition of Christianity [geschichtJiche UberlieJ~rllngl and the ef­
fects or significance of that history in the present. Wobbermin insists that 
the entire historic tradition of Christianity must be subjected to the most 
rigorous historical research both in order to strip away false supports for 
faith and to uncover or reveal the truly historic elements from th,1l trddi­
tion. Geschichte in the sense of the hisloric tradition musl be subjected to 
rigorous historical research in order to uncover or reveal those essenli,11 
elements. But that research will never provide the effects oJ'lhose historic 
elements; it will only uncover or reveal the essenlidl elements, 'nle ef­
fects of those elements are always prior to historical research of the tradi­
tion that carries them and independent of the results of lhat resedJ'ch. " 
Christian faith, for Wobbermin, requires immediately ,wailable historic 
effects rather than the secondary, provisional results of historical resedJ'ch 
into the tradition. The historic tradition alone cannot serve dS the basis 
of Christian faith because it always remains past. Il is the elt'eets of that 
history, immediately present and eflicacious in the present. that serve as 
the basis of faith. ls 
Wobbermin also proVides a third definition of Geschichte based on 
the philosophy of history of Heinrich Rickert, of which Wobbermin oilers 
only a brief and cursory analysis in his essdy. According to Guy Oakes, 
Rickert's project was largely an attempt to solve the hi/ltliS irrtlliotul!is be­
14, IhiJ., 6-7. 'nlis is Wobherll1in's opinion, but he Joe;; not "dJress Ihc' posslhility 
that a rigorous historical criticism of these historic dements will p~rhaps (.11\ them inh> 
question rather th"n confirm them. This is one of the major weaknesses of Wubb~f/Ilin:~ 
position. as it also is for K,ihler's and for Herrmann's. 
15. Thi; further distinctiun between Geschichte and its WirkulIg ur \VirkSl//llk"il i, ,) 
distinction that Wobherll1in himself Jocs not make explicit. but he do~s indicate such 
a distinction, ever so briefly, when he allempts to distinguish betwe~n Gesd/ichte ,IS 
Ober/ieJen/llg and the elfect or diic,lCy of Geschichte, its Wirkllllg ()f IVirkSilll,k,;i/: '''I h~ 
essence of'histury' namely is not exhallsleJ in the fact that il olTers the h"tnf/C traditiull 
- tradition that heiOllgS to the past and that only has value for the presenl in its rec"lkct­
ing what is past. No, history extends intu the present anJ w\lrks itself Ulit in the present 
- anJ certainly not merely thfllugh inJiviJualtraJiliuns, hut rather through the fact of 
history itself:' ["Das We;;en der 'Geschichte' ist nail/lid, lIichl dLll1lit lind dl/rill ersdlijl'ti. 
dafJ sie geschichlliche UeberlieJenll1g biew - Ueber/ietenmg, die da VCl'gilll~enll,;it illli:'" 
hart WId Jiir die Gegenwart I1ttr dell Wert tier EI';nnen/llg all lIelgLlt/gelles IWI. t'Je;n die 
Geschichte reicht in die Gegellwarl hinein Imd wirkt sich ill der G"gellwllrt IIIIS - ulIJ Zlt'tll' 
nichl blofJ durch eil1u/ne Ueberliefenll1gell, sondei'll tlwd, dell Tlllb"stLlII<I Jer Gesdlidile 
selbsl."]lbiJ., 7. This Ji;tinction between Geschichte as ",hat remains p'bl anJ the efrect 
or efficacy of Geschichle ,,,ill be Jiscussed in more Jetail below. 
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\ween concepl '\l1d re,11 it y by means of a chai n of reason ing with five links. 
'1 hese live links are a thcory of the phenomenology of reality, a critique 
of episl<:mologicli re,1! ism, a I hel)ry of (()gnitive interests and a theory of 
concepts, ,1n ,Inalysis of the limits of concept formation in natural scicnce, 
aIIII ,\ dem,lrcli ion criterion for distinguishing natural science from his­
torical or cultur,JI science H , It is to one part of this Iinal "link" in Rickert's 
ch.\in of re,1Soning Ihat VVobhermin (1ppears to turn for support of his 
final ddillilion or (;csc/tic!lte as the realm of value and as the interrelation 
of hun1<111 heings as moral-spiritual beings in their development, and the 
key 10 this delinitionlies in Rickert's underslanding of value. 
Accllrding I,) I(ickert, the IheoretiC<11 interest of historical science 
IS J"(Hlled in the value historians ascribe to the individual as a unique 
historic entity. 'I he u)nccpl of value enables historians to distinguish 
hetween import,lnl nr valuable historic ligures and the great mass of all 
other historic '·Igmes. Without such a distinction historical knowledge 
wLluld be imflossihle, because of what Rickert called the "extensive and 
\lltensivc intinily of reJlity."\7 This is one of the important distinctions 
belween the n,1Iura! sciences lNaturwissensc!wften] and the cultural sci­
ences \C;(;/slL'sw/,i,ielbc!/(lfiell!. The natural sciences, according to Rickert, 
.Ire c,1I1cerned with the general and the universal, while the cultural sci­
ences (including historical science) are concerned with the unique and 
the individual. Hist,)riC<11 science is not ultimately concerned with the past 
for the sake of the p,1st, but for the sake of the present, namely in terms 
uf a \',1Iue-relation IWertbeziellllllg] hetween the past and the present and 
in terms of history's essential characteristic of development.l~ Historical 
[6.	 Oake" "[<ickl'rt', 'thl'ory of Historicdl Kno,\'Iedge," xvii. 
17. 'Ihl' l'xkmivl' Infinity 01 rl',llity concerns the endless 1'lIlendlichl anJ the un­
surl'l'yahk [lIl1iilh.:r;cldll1r! chdracter of reality, Reality IS IIl1el1dlich insofar as it cannot 
he I'xh,lllstively incurporated into our experience, and il is II/ltiber;ehbar insofar as it is 
nll!-,os,ihk lu surl'c'y Ihl' whuk "I' reality. 'fhe Intensive innllil)' of reality, on the other 
hand, Cllncerns thl' individual. 'I hI' composite l'kments of each indiviJual event or figure 
arl' unlilllilcli in prinl'ipk. anJ l'very event or figur~ can possess an intinite number of 
a,pl'ets. I(il'kl'rl ""1Hllarizes these daims by del1ning reality ,IS fundamentally irrational, 
Ille,nling lhal lhac IS nu criterion lin deCiding 'vhJt wllulJ qualify as complete knowl­
edgl' ot'thl' whole or ufthl' inJ,vidll,11 JSp~cts. But l(jck~rl claims thJt this description of 
re.t1it), as II'raliol"t1 i, a phl'nllJllCnological rather than an ontological dailll, It concerns 
our l'xpl'l'il'ncl' 01' rl'.t1ily rather than r~Jlit)' ill ;e, Rickert, Die GreJIzell der lIa/unvi;­
S/.'IISc!lIItilitl,ell l3c:gritf;/Jiltlllllg, 31--15 See JISll Oakes, "Rickert's lheory ot Historical 
KIHlI"kdgc:,"	 n'li, 
IH, I{ickert dl'scribes Ihe cl)nCepl o(developl1l~nt IElllwickJlIllg;begrilil as the concept 
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science, for Rickert, is about value and about reality as it is eXllerienced 
rather than about reality in se. In other words, histl)ricJI science has il 
phenomenological rather than an ontological b;)sis.l~ 
Rickert does not distinguish between Geschicilte and Historic ,IS 
vVobbermin uses those terms, but vVobberl11in nevertheless believes thill 
his distinction Iinds support in Rickert's work. While there is a plausible 
con nection between vVobberl11 in's understand ing of Gesellililte and 
Rickert's understanding of the uniqueness of historic individuals dnd of 
the importance of development and the interrelation of past ligures 'lIld 
present individuals in terms of the value of past figures for the present, 
it is a very slim connection, and Wobbermin does not give an adequate 
defense of his claim to have found support in Rickert's work,~'1 
vVobbermin claims to have arrived at a third delinitioll of (;esdlicllte 
on the basis of his reading of Rickert, but his just'ilication fl)r a Rickertian 
basis never achieves the clarity necessary to make a judgment on its 
merits as a faithful interpretation and application of Rickert's philoso­
phy of history. Nevertheless, he claims to have achieved a third delinilion 
of Geschichte on the basis of Rickert's work, namely Gesell/eilte as "the 
interrelation of human beings as spiritual-moral beings in their develop­
ment." And again, "the interrelation of spiritual-moral individuals con­
stitutes Geschichte - their interrelation, however, in its development. For 
the element of development also belongs to the essence of Gesellicilte."21 
that "brings to expression the logical essence of historic,tI ,ck'lce" Jild Ilile Ihal further 
develops the principlc of value- relalion. Rickert, Die Cren:::el/ del' I/c!Cllrll'is.<Cl/sdltl/i/i ..hcl/ 
Begriff;bildLll1g, 396. 
19. Oakes," Rickert's Theory of Histllrical l< nowledge," xvii. 
20, In fact, Wobberrnin's treatmenl barely scratches the surfaCe' of RiLk<:rt's wurk, 
anJ he appears to Jraw only one substantial conclusion from hi, r~ading 'If l{ickl'rL, 
namely that cultural value is intimately related to the spiritual-morallik, Unf,'rLunatcly, 
Vv'obbermin fails to proviJe a sutlicit'nt justificatil)ll for this conclusi'Jn, Jnd he due, 11Ilt 
refer to any of Rickert's own texts to support that specilic claim. He dol'S claim Ihat IllS 
third anJ final definition of Ge;chichle is bas~d on Rickert's "'ork, but hI' fails 10 giVl' any 
evidence that this is the case. It is difficult to determine why, Ih~n, W"bbl'rmin founJ \I 
necessary 10 engage Rickert's work al all. See Wobberrnin, Ge;cllichle IIl1d l-li;lori~, 7·-t~, 
21. "Ceschichte ist cloch letz{id, der ZlIsallllllellllclllg cla tHell;chell <1/'; gei;lig';ltlhcha 
Wesell ill s~iller Enlwick/lIlIg. .. , Der ZII;i1i11l1lellhdllggei;lig-sitrlicher We;ell 11/;0 s/t'II! die 
Geschicht~ dar. /hr ZU5ammenhallg aber ill ;e;lIer En/wi(k/lIl1g Dellll all"" cia; t"olI/elll 
der EHlwickhmg gehdr/ Will We;cn der Ge;chichle." Ibid., l-1. Wobb~[Jnin's lldinition 
does have a Rickertian basis insofar as it appropriat~s Rickerlian Ierminlllugy, hUI bl'­
yond this semantic or cOllCeplual similarity there is little substantial engagcllll'nt wilh 
Rickert's philosoph)' of history. 
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CL':5c!ticlttc, I hen, is not merely what is past and static. Rather, it is the realm 
or inter rdal io n <\Ild development, 0 f conti nuing efficacy and value, wh ich 
pnsisls ,111(1 eXlcl1ds into lhe present. Cese!tiehte is not a closed system 
but a livillg pro(ess dnd d present relation of individuals to one another 
<llHlto the past.·' he eillbodiment of spiritual-moral relation, Wobbermin 
suggests, "is the constitutive essential feature of Cescllieftte."" 
lfllim<llc1y it is the concepts of relation and value that serve as the 
mosl important <Ispeds of this third dehnition of Geschichte. Value, espe­
(ially Ihe value of the historic pi({ure of Christ, is an important concept 
for Wobberl1lin; IHlwever, it is often simply collapsed into the concept of 
the elleets or etli(Jey of that picture. The concept of relation will become 
more impol·tant in vVobbermin's "religio-psychologica\ circle:' which 
fmms the basis of his religio-psychological theological method and 
whi(h he constructs on the basis of his distinction between Geschichte 
anJ Ilisforic. 
Having arrived al three definitions of Gesdtich/e, it is now necessary 
10 review these definitions of Geschicllte and Historie and the distinctions 
and relationships hetween them. In his opening section \Nobbermin be­
gillS by offering a hasic definition of Gesc!tichte as simply what has hap­
pened, or what is past. He then refines that definition to emphasize the 
ellee!> or eflicacy of historic events and figures, and finally he expands 
the Jdinilion of Gt:sclticftte to emphasize the concepts of interrelation, 
development, and value. All of this, then, is opposed to Historie, which is 
defined as lhe scientific illvestigation of CesL/liehfe and the results of that 
investigation. !lis/orit: serves the purpose of erecting boundaries around 
C;csc!licll/C:, to separate what is historic from what is not historicY What 
22. "Dcr 11I".:,;ri(f dIe,er gei,cig-,illficllell Beziehungell, die den ZusLl/llmel/hang 
cia "{cl/,,Id/cil ali g<lllza gnv<il/rleiilel/, iir die kOl/slilllierende ~Veiemlllerkl1lat der 
G':iclIlCJIlC." Ihid., 15 .. , his cOIl<:epl of relation Ivill become much more important in the 
(O,HeXI 01 Wohhcrtlllil'S reli~io-psydHllogicalcircle between present individual religiOUS 
espcricm:c ~l1d hisloric Llcts. ·lhe rehgio-psychological circle will be discussed ill more 
del,lil [11 thc follmving ch~pler. 
2.~. ~krc It docs appe,lr that Wohbermin is granting a mor~ positive role to Historie 
Ih.ln pcrh.lps he is Willing 10 admil. If Hi,lorie is capable of separating the truly historic 
from thc broader tr~dilion of Christianity, it is performing a necessary positive function. 
Wohherillill duc> gr,lnt ,I p'lsitlvc relationship of Historie In Geschicl/te at other points 
ill thiS ess,ly, hUI he ahvays Lju<Iiilies his determination of this role with an insislc::nce 
Ih.H faith in [/(j w~y depends on the results of hislnrical research. But Historie can playa 
ncccssMy and even pu,itiv\: role in establishlllg Ihe founddtion fen faith withuut thereby 
1''''ll/lllllg that fOUlld,llioll. It is, as Wohbermin puts it, second-order reflection 011 a prior, 
Geschichte und Historie 
is historic, though, is not limited by or confined to Historic:. 'TIle historic 
will persist beyond and sometimes even in spite of the results of histori(al 
research both by virtue of its primacy - Historie, Wobbennin mJintains, 
always retains a secondary character to the primdcy of (,'esdlldttc - 'llld 
by virtue of its signihcance. 
Here it is necessary to introduce a further distinction, one that 
Wobbermin himself did not consciously or explicitly make. It is neces­
sary to Jistinguish between Historie, Gescftidlfe, and the ellect or elilc<!cy 
(Wirkung or Wirksdmkeit] of Geschicftte. 24 Geseftic!tfe is subject to his­
torical research, to Historie, which produces sCientihcally ensured results. 
These results, however, can never serve as the foundation of Christian 
faith because they always remain secondary qua results. Wh,ll is primary, 
for \Nobbermin, is the effect or efficacy [Wirkung or Wirksoll1kcitj of 
Geschichte, of an historic hgure or event that always precedes and tran­
scends historical investigation.!S That effect or efficacy cannot be proVided 
by historical research and cannot rest 011 Historie, however vigorously 
prosecuted. It confronts individuals directly in and through Gesdlidlfc 
and is immediately available to religious experience. In this sense, then, 
the historicity or the historical verihability of a past event or figure is ul­
timately irrelevant, or at least secondary; the effect of thal historic event 
or figure is primary. 
One passage in particulM provides support for this further distinc­
tion. Wobbermin suggests that the "historic fact" of Christ exists apart 
from and prior to faith, but that it also includes within it a presupposition 
of faith and therefore can only be effective or efficaCiOUs for faith: 
primary reality. That prior, primary reality (i.e., Geschichte, and nHlre spl'cifil-ally the' 
efJects or efficacy of Geschichtc) is the foundalion of faith. 
24. Wobbermin does reftT 10 c::rfect or etiicac)' in his second delinilion of Geicltichte, 
but in the remainder of his essay effect or efficacy functiolls as a third calegory, dislillCI 
from both Historie and Gescltichte. 
25. It is tempting to label this third e1emcnt as "Wirkungsgeschichk:' or "histe'r}' of 
effecls" (generally of a text or work of arl). Hans- Ceurg (;adamer, for example, con· 
siders the concept of Wirkllngsgeschichce to be essential fur hermeneutics, and it is in 
the Cllntcxt of Wirkllngsgeschichte that he develops his cOllcept of a "fusion of huriwns" 
IHo,-izoncvasch,lIe!wngl. See Gadamer, Trllth alld /\;Icthod, 300-7 [1 he origin~1 Gerill~n 
is available as WahrJteiclimi Mechode\. In Wobberrnin's unJcrslanding of the rdaliunship 
between Geschichle and its dfects or dhcacy, however, this purdy htTilleneutical scnse is 
missing. ln this case "geschichtliche Wirkung" or "die:: Wirkung der C;cschichte" rdlects 
his intentions more precisely than "Wirkullgsgeschichte" ill Cad,uller's sense, panieu­
larly in light of the lack uf any attention 10 hermeneutics as such in Wohbermin's ess~y 
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' Ihe hI stori c faLl ,li so exists completely apart from faith. But the 
hi storic 1 ~ld as such also includ es within it a reference to a pre-
~lJ Ppositioll of faith Ih ,lt is dncacious in it, and it call theretore 
bcc'(lllll' dli cclcious only for tilith .'" 
In terlllS () f the relationship between faith and histo ry, it is the im-
medi ately available elrcct or the efficacy of the historic picture of Christ, 
ullc()wred tlr I'eveal ed hy historical research bUl not dependent on the 
resullS of th :lt rese,lrch qlla resulls or product of that research, that awak-
ells 1".1 it h inCh ris!. ' I he pe rson of eh rist is a fact of Geschichte, and as 
such is opell to th e full r ~lngl' of histo ric al rese<lrch. But il is always prior 
to rii .-; Io ri(' and ill that sens e remains independent o f it. B)I distinguishin g 
hctwel' ll C('.'(lticitl(' and its ellecls or effi cacy, and by further distinguish -
ing thOSe elleds frol11 historical investigation of Geschicltte, Wobbermin 
believes it possi hle to maintain a necessar)' ro le for historical research 
without therehy nuking faith dependent on its resulting portrait of JeSllS 
Christ. Wobberl11in himself did not explicitly draw this distinc tion be-
tween C;esdticltle a nd ilS WirkulIg or Wirks,JlIlkeil, but if such a distinc-
ti o n proves helpful ill dMifying "vVobhermin's position it will have proved 
its lls efuI11e%. 
Ha vin g estahlished his definitions of Geschichle and Historie, in the 
second section of his essay \Vobbermin turns to earlier effo rts to solve the 
prnblel11 ofCaith and history. LlCh of these attempts, Wobbermin suggests, 
shares Illuch ill common with his own attempt to solve the problem. But 
he cll l1tends that his distinction between Geschichte and Historie moves 
him close r to a soluti on than these pre vious attempts by more clearly 
identifying the problem and by providing a more defensible solution. 
WOBRERI'vIIN'S APPRAI SAL AND CRITIQUE 
OF PREVIOUS POSITIONS 
Wobb erl1lin did not in ve nt the distin c ti on between Geschichte and 
f1l510ri('. CI he explicit di stinction had already been made by Martin Kahler 
in 1892, and olhers were making similar distinctions hetween history as 
what is pasl and history as modern sc ientific historical research before 
26. "Die geschicll/liche Tel/Seiche /Jesteht durchaus aucil abgesehm VO Il Glal lb el"!. A bt',- die 
geschichtlicll t: Tuisa cile schliej]t allt:rdings als solelle den Hir/1veis auf eill e ill ihr wil"ksarne 
Glu II/J ell svolCluS).;tz lIllg ill sic/r, Wid sit: komi demgemiij3 atlch IIUI" pir den Glallben . 
wirk;alll .verdell ." \,y"bbnlllill , Gesdlich te //lId Historie, 27. 
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Wobbermin's appeal for a stricter conceptual distinction ." In thi s eSS<ly 
vVobbermin offers appraisals and critiques of four significanl alkmpts to 
solve the problem offaith and history, those ofGotthold Ephraim Less illg , 
Martin Kahler, Wilhelm Herrmann, and Wilhelm Bousset. By itllcrprc't-
ing what he considers to be the se minal texts Oil the prohlem of faith 
and histor)! as it relates to a distill c tion between Gesciticille and fii5tori l', 
Wobbermin hopes to discover where he can build on the strengths and 
perhaps improve upon some of the weaknesses of these earlier elt"orts. 
An analYSis ofWobbennin's own critique of lhese previolls f1os ition s \\,i11 
show where vVobbennin was able to move the di sc uss ion fo rwdrd <Inti 
where he became ensnared in similar or unique difficultie s. 
Gotthold Ephraim Less illg 
In his study o f Lessing, Gordon Michalson, Jr., descrihes th e ill1p<lct of 
Less ing's famous "ditch" on the centuries that followed: 
An image or a metaphor, although introduced almost casuJll y, 
sometimes tJkes on a life of" it s own, insuring a Illeasure ot" im -
mortality for its inventor .... Lessing 's "ugly dit ch," if not the 11I0st 
frequently cilt'd nonhiblical image within Prot es tant theology 
during the past two centuries, is certainly in the running for rhat 
dubious title. ~s 
Despite the near ubiqUity of "Lessing's d itch" ill subsequent Pro testant 
theology and the myriad efforts lo leap it, IV[i chalson detects a persistent 
misunderstanding or simplification of Lessing's own presentation in his 
brief polemical letter, On the Proof of the Spirit and o. f"Power. In that text, 
Michalson argues, Lessing does not present one "ditch," but three. 
The first ditch in Lessing's letter is whal Michalson calls the "tem-
poral-factual ditch;' the great historical distance between, for example, 
miraculous events occurring in the first century CE and the present. 
27. S~e , e. g., Rei schk "Der Streit tiber die Begrlilldung Jes (;lauhellS ,1lIf tim 'ge -
sch ichtli c h~' Jesus Chri stus." Se~ also Frcsen ius, -'Die: Bedeutung del' (;eschichtl lchkcit 
J ~S ll fUr J~1l Glallben" for a use of this Jistinction oy one of Wobbe rill in's cll lltelllf!llfaries. 
Freseni1l5, for example, makes explicit what remains merely illlf)li cit ill Wubhnll1ill's essay, 
namely the Jistinction between Geschichte and its Wirkullg or Wir!.:slllilkeit. i'resellius. 
"Die BeJwtung Jer Geschi ch tli chkeit jesu," 258. GorJnn Rupp brielly sketches tbe (Oll-
tours of the Jebare conce rning rhe distinction between Gescilichte and Historit: ill th e 
t 9105 in a chaprer entitleJ "Christ anJ Cult." See Rupp, Cllltllre-Protestalltislll, 25--32. 
28. Michalson, Lessing's "Ugly Ditch," l. 
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Lessillg Ill,lkes d distillction between first-hand experience of an event 
and seC<Jlld ,halld knlJwledge of that event hased on testimony: "Miracles 
Ih,l! I see wilh my own eyes, and have an opportunity to test, are one 
thing; miracles of which I know only historically [Ilistorisch) that others 
claim to have san and tested them are another:"" 'Tne historical distanCe 
between the p,ISI evenl ,lI1d the present invariably weakens that event's 
pOlver 10 convillce because it is now being mediated through any number 
of persons or illstitutions, L.essing asks, "Is what I read in credible histori­
,1I1S invdri,lhly JUSI as cert,lin for me as what [experience myself? I am not 
,1Wdre that dnyonc h,ls cver made such a clailll,"io 
Hlllvcver, ,\$ Ivlichdlson suggests, Lessing's first, "temporal-factual 
ditch" is in Llct a ''red herring:' beC<lUSe the issue for Lessing is not primar­
ily factual bUI logical. Historicli reports are unreliable, not for any factual 
reaSt)J], but hecHlse they cannot be demonstrated logicllly, As Lessing 
puiS it, "ff no historical truth [Izistorische Wa!lrheit] can be demonstrated, 
then IWlhing C,1Il be demonstrated by mealls of historical truths. TI1dt is, 
tlcdt/cntlll IrLlIlls of lustory [GeschichtswahrheitellJ can never become the 
pwu!u!lIecessllry I rut Its o!retlSOII."JI Th is Leibnizian 11 distinction between 
contingency ,1 IIII necessity (what Lessing actually calls the "broad, ugly 
ditch"") is wh,lt Michalson calls the "metaphysical ditch;' the problem 
of two chsses of truth (i.e., historical truth and religiOUS or metaphysical 
trut h). AlId it is th is sh it1 from [he lemporal- factual to the metaphysi­
cal lhal IllClrks the tr,lIlsition to the heart of Lessing's argument. In this 
section, Lessing asks how he is to accept as true the claim that Christ is 
lhe Son of C;od on the basis of his resurrection from the dead. Lessing is 
willing to accept as true the fact that ksus proclaimed himself to be the 
29 I cssing. "Uehe'" den 13,'v'/ei, de, Ceisles unJ Jer Kraft:' 3 [ET: "On the Proof of 
the Spiril anJ o( Power," 8-11. 
311 IIJIlI, S WI', (lSI 
31, Ibid, ":Illph:"i, in origin,,1 
32. Toshin,asa Yasukata notes Ihat Lessing b<lrroweJ this Jistinction between truths 
01' history anJ truths o( rcason from a similar dislinction Jrawn by CotlfrieJ Wilhelm 
I.eibniz bct IVe'en truths of reason [verites de IWSOllnement or Vemwiftswahrheitell J anJ 
f.l<:tll"llrulhs Iverites tie jllit or TatsachemvCl!lriIeilClll. 111e distinction, f,x Leibniz, resteJ 
on the di,llndlon bel ween illlpo"ibiliry anJ possibilil)': "Truths of reason are necessary 
alld their oppo,ite is impossible; f.lClual truths arc c<lnlingent anJ their opposite is 1'05­
,ibk." !.elhniz, cited in Ya"ukata, Les:illJ{s Pllilo:iupiIy of Religiull, 60. 
33. !.e,;sing, "Ueber den BelVeis Jes Geisles unJ dn Krati," 7 lET: "On the Proof of 
Ihe SllJril anJ "f Power:' 871. 
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Son of God and that his disciples also claimed this 011 the b<lsis of the 
resurrection of Jesus from the dead, because, Lessingadmils, he h,1S no 
serious historical objections to the resurrection. TheseJaims concern the 
same, historic<ll class of truth. 
The "metaphysical ditch" is encountered when tll;:se historical, (011­
tingent truths are made the basis of religious or ratiorill necessary Iruth. 
Lessing continues: 
But to make the leap from this historical lrulh Iilis/ori:icltell 
Wahrheill into a quite different class of tl'uths, and D I't'cjllire 111<' 
to revise all my metaphysical and moral concepts acordingly; to 
expect Illt' to change all Illy basic ideas all the l1,ltUfC of the deity 
because I cannot ofier an)' aedible evidence against he resurrec­
tion of Christ - if this is not a iJET0(30015 E1s' aAAo yivos' [transi­
tion into another category), I do not know Wh;lt Ar~lotle Illeant 
by that phraseJ'1 
TI1is distance between two classes of truths is the 'broad, ugly ditch" 
that Lessing claims to be unable to leap. By surveying this ditch <lnd by 
mapping its terrain, its breadth and its depth, Lessing ,Iltroduced some­
thing nove! into Western religiOUS thought. AccordinglO Hemy AliisOll, 
"Lessing was the first thinker to separate the question of Ihe Iruth of the 
Christian religion from the question of its historical 'oundation.";' Or, 
to put it even more boldly, Lessing's argument cOllstilLies "lhe conlplele 
elimi nation of the historical from religion."\~ 
As Michalson suggests, however, Lessing is perfectly comfort­
able making his home on the "necessary" side of this ditch, because for 
Lessing the truth of Christianity is ralional and, if not antihistorical, at 
least unhistorical in natureJ7 1ne first ditch, the tempot-al-factual ditch, 
becomes irrelevant for Lessing precisely because the trUlh of Christianity 
finally has nothing to do with history at all. Or, as Ivlichalson notes, for 
Lessing Christianity is true because of its rational, "inn:r" truth and not 
because of its historical facticity.J8 For Lessing then, (.nly the lIIeanillg 
of Christianity can be conveyed by history, never its il'lltll. Its truth is 
34. IbiJ, 7 lET, 87]. 
35. Alli$OIl, Less;rlg emtl the Enlighrenmwt, viii. 
36. This is the juJgment of GOltfried Fittbogen, ~itl'J in Alli"ln, Les:iillg Will Ihe 
Enlightenment, 103, 
37. Michalson, LeS:iing's "Ugly DitciI," 12. 
38. IbiJ., 32. 
29 
h\ITII AT THE INTERSECTION OF HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE 
necessary <\lId rati(liwl rather than contingent and historical. Michalson 
sumlll<JriLes Lessing's posilioll in terms of the illustrative power of history 
and the rationell essence of Christian faith: 
lIlIil1l;lIely, lhen, Lessing's position on t'aith JnJ histo['ical knowl­
edgL' is derived lrom Illore fundamental COlllnlitnlents concerning 
(ailh and reJS<ln on til<: one hand, and re;lson and revel'ltion on the 
olhCl ,1lIlhelllic t'aith is ratiO[l;li and potentially universalizable, 
llle,lI1ing lh,1l il docs nOI hang on the acceptance 01 any historical 
(aL'ts; Jilli hisloric.li revelations Jo not introduce n<::w and indis­
1 <::nsahk religIOUS inforJllation but simply illust['ate, or hring inlo 
' 
our ti,'ld o!visinll, whJt we J['<:: capable oFkno\ving all along J9 
'I here is, however, yet <mother "ditch" ill Lessing's letter. This third 
and llnal ditch is what Michalson calls the "existential ditch" or the 
prohlem of religious appropriation, and he suggests that this ditch is the 
common theme rUllning through the entire letter. It is the problem of a 
modem paSOll dpproprialing and believing a message that is strange, in­
credible, and perhdps even scandalous. In this context Lessing is particu­
1,lrly concerned with the autonomy of the rational human being, and he is 
unwilling 10 sacrifice lhal autonomy in order to believe a message solely 
on the bdsis of the duthorily of Scripture, church, or tradition, For Lessing 
it is ultimately d Illdtler 01 distingUishing between the "outer" (e,g., his­
torical events) dnd the "inner" (the autonomous, moral-religious self).'IO 
I.essing's preference for the "inner truth" of Christianity over against its 
extemal, historical foundations or "proofs" marks the first time in the 
West that '·the questi<.)Il of the faeticity of the Christian revelation was 
held to be irrelevant for the truth of the Christian religion."<1 As Lessing 
claims in respollSe to Hermann Samuel Reimarus, 
The ktk[' is not the spirit, and the Biole is not religion. . The 
rdigi<ln is not true beclllse the evangelists and the apostles taught 
it, but they laughl il b<::cause it is true. The ~vritten traditions must 
be nplained accorJing to their inner truth, and no written tradi­
tion Cdn giv<:: it an)' innn lruth iF it has none,<~ 
39. Ihid, 39. U>sing's rdcrences to Ihe iltustrJlivc power of history will be adopted 
hy KJnl and IJtCl' r('worked hy W"hberillill, who, surprisingly, do('s nOI refer to this de­
Illelll "f I.c"illg's Ihnllgh!. 
'10. tbid., 4H-~9. 
41 ..A.lli"lll, Lesslllg ,.md Ihe Eillightellillent, 96. 
42. I.e,sing, cited in Allison, Lessing ullli tile Enligilletll>lent, 95-96. 
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'TIle Christian religion is true, then, insofar as it expresses this inner, 
rational truth that is immediately available to nltion,ll hUf11,1I1 beings. It 
is not true on the basis of historical demonstrations, or on the basis of 
the testimony of the apostles or the evangelists, or 011 the basis of the 
Christian tradition or the authority of the church. ll)is is so because, as 
Lessing puts it in his famous "metaphysical" ditch, "accideillal truths of 
history can never become the proof of necessary truths of re'lS011."<\ 
Wobbermin's Appraisal and Critique of Lessing's Position 
In introducing the section in which he appraises previous positions on 
the problem of faith and history, Wobbermin notes that he is pllIposely 
selecting positions with which he finds some level ofagreemenl.'< He ,llso 
admits that Lessing does not belong directly to the group that folluws, 
primarily because Lessing is not, strictly speaking, a Protestant theolo­
gian. Wobbermin's critique of Lessing will therefore be of a more general 
character than those that follow. 
Lessing's famous "ditch" plays an important role in subsequent 
discussions of the relationship between Christian faith and history, and 
Wobbermin restricts his comments to this one sentence of Lessing's Ieller 
On the ProDfof the Spirit and of Power. There is nothing in Wobbermin's 
analysis to indicate that he appreciated any of the nuances in Lessing's 
presentation, or that he was aware of the possibility that more than one 
"ditch" is being discussed. Everything hangs on Lessing's one sentence: 
"Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary 
truths of reason,"<s 
Wobbermin suggests that Lessing's "ditch" suffers Irom certain con­
ceptual ambiguities, most importantly in terms 01 the relationship be­
tween truth and history. Such conceptual ambiguity can be eliminated, 
Wobbermin offers, by reframing Lessing's statement with speCific refer­
ence to the distinct ion between Geschichte and Historie, rows Wobberm in 
would restate the proposition to read: "Individual historical cognitions 
can never become proof of eternal truths of Geschichte."·'6 
43. l.essing, "Ueber Jen Beweis Jes Geisles und Jer Kral1:' 5 [FT: "On the Proof of 
Ihe Spirit and of Power," 85]. 
44. Wobbermin, Geschichte Wid Historie, 16. 
45. "Z!lJiillige Geschichlswahrheilen kiillllen der Bnveis VOn l1ollllvendigl'lI 
Verl1lll1ftswahrheiten nil' werden." Lessing, "Ueber Jen Flc:weis des Ceisles und der KrJI't;' 
5 [ET: "Onlhe Proof of the Spiril and of Power," 85]. 
46. "Historische Einzelerkel//llnisse kiinnCll del' Beweis von e,vigen Ceschichtswul'II'lleit<!n 
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'!'oshim<lsa '(asubla notes that Lessing uses the terms historische 
\Villtrhr:ilt:rl (h istoricalt ruths) and Ceschichtswnhrheiten (truths of history 
or historic I ruths) interchangeably, and he argues, similarly to Wobbermin 
(bul wi tholl t nH:nl iOll ofWohberl11 in's criticisms of Lessi ng), that Lessi ng's 
position would be strengthened by a distinction between the tlVO terms. 
I.essing proposeS lh~lt "if no historicdl truth [historische WahrheilJ can 
he denHlnstr,lIed, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of his­
toricaltrulhs.·1 hat is, accidental truths of history [Gesdlichtswahrheiten] 
can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason."·7 Yasukata 
Sllggests lh~ll I.essing's argllment lacks conceptual clarity precisely at this 
l1oilll.·I.' W\)hhermin sh,Hes this concern, and he reworks Lessing's "ditch" 
to distinguish between (;t:Sc!/i(!lte and Historie, thereby attempting to re­
direct atlelltion to whM he considers to be the more difficult problem of 
t~lilh ,lIll! hist\)ry. 
According to WobberI11in, Lessing's ditch suffers from a metaphysi­
cal delicil, which is especially ironic given Michalson's conclusion that 
this particular slatement concerns precisely the "metaphysical" problem 
of rel'lling two diti'erent cldsses of truth. But Wobbermin does not share 
N[ichalsoll'S definition \)1' the problem. 111e problem, as Wobbermin sees 
it, is Iwt bel ween two clclsses of truth; the problem is the assumption that 
there eein be two c1,lsses of truth at all. For Wobbermin, unlike Lessing, 
there is only one class of truth: eternal truths of Geschichte. 'n1ere is no 
such thing, rherefore, as ",lCcidental" or "contingent" truths. What Lessing 
calls acciJenlal truths of history, Wobbermin calls individual historical 
cogn it ions. AII trut hs Me truths of Gescllichte because only in and th rough 
Cesdlidllt: Gln truth be represented to thinking subjects who themselves 
stand within C;t:sehidlte.-Io 
/lie werc/clI." Wobl1l'rlllill, Gi!5clridllC 1I11d Hislorie, 17. 
47. l.eosll1g, "Uchc'r dcn Bcwcis Jes CeislCs und der Kraft;' S [ET: "On Ihe Proof of 
the Spirit and o( t'"wer," 851. 
4.s. Yasuk.!I,1 doc', admil lhal Ihae W,lS nn such Jistinuiun beIwcen G,;schiellie anJ 
rlzslorie ill thc lale eigillecnih century_ 13ul he alsu sugge,ts thaI Lessing was aware of a 
hISI,)ricIly [(;esdlidillichkeit! lhal cunnnt be approached by historical science, anJ he 
a,ks, "Bul i( he kIlUW' this, why, theu, is he so careless in his use of Ihese lerms?" The 
answcr, Yasuk.lla suggests, is III be founJ in I.essing's relatiull uf revelation to reason, or 
In whal iVlicha\soil calls the "exislcnlial Jitch." Yasukata, Lessing's Philosophy of Religion, 
08; lAS, nl\. S7 al1J SIS 
49. Wohberlllln, Gesell/chic lind rl/Slorie, 18. 
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Here Wobbermin rarts company with Lessing on the nalure oflruth. 
While Lessing wants to define truth in purely rational terms, Wobbermin 
prefers to speak of truths operative in andth rough Geschichte. Wobberm in 
hopes to avoid Lessing's rejection of historical demonstrations of truth by 
distinguishing between Historie and Geschicllte. Historical research (or, to 
use vVobbermin's term here, "individual historical cognirions") will never 
provide eternal, historic truths precisely because historical reseclrch yields 
results that are always provisional, relative, and probable. But Gescllidllc.:, 
being the realm of value and of efficacy, withstands historic11 inquiry .111l! 
serves as the vehicle of absolute, eternal truths. 
Wobbermin's reasoning is not clear at this point, as he does not l,lke 
the further step of defining precisely how eternal truth is present within 
and through Geschichte.;ll Only later does he address the role of Scripture 
(as divine revelation and the early church's testimony) as lhe vehicle of 
eternal truth, but that further step is missing in this early essay. 
Wobbermin is content to define eternal truths srecitically as religiuus 
truths: "The label 'eternal' should be understood in the s[Jecitic sense of 
religious faith - truths belonging to the world of eternity, established in 
it, and originating in i1."5 1 Because, according to Wobbermin, "eternal 
truths" are sU[Jramundane, they cannot be proved by historical research. 
Such truths defy rroofand confront historic subjects only in and through 
Geschichte. As such they are accessible only to faith. 
To put it in Michalson's terms, here \!\Tobbermin is attelllrting to solve 
the problem of religiOUS appropriation, to lear across what Michalson 
calls Lessing's "existential ditch." But whereas Lessing turns to the "in­
ner self" to discover a truth already present in reason, Wobbennin turns 
to Geschichte as the vehicle of eternal truth. Lessing has no need at all 
of Historie or Geschichte in any but an i1lustralive caracity; Wobbermin, 
on the other hand, bases everything here on a distinction between truth 
provided by historical science and religiOUS truth becoming immedialely 
present to believers in and through Ceschichte, independent of ,my histor­
ical inquiry into past facts, figures, or events. It is enough for Wobbermin 
50. There are inJications, Jiscussed below, ul' such a slep in Wobherl1lin's uilique ol' 
Bousser's position, in which 130usset subordinates Gesd/idlle 10 reasun. Wnbhermil1l'rc­
l'ers to subordinate reason to Geschichle, which puts him at oJJ, wilh l.cssing as well. 
51. "Das Beiwort 'ewig' 501/ also ill/ spezijischell Silllie des religiosell Glul/bells verS{,III­
den werden: Wahrheiten, die der Well der EWigkcil lIngehiirerr, ill illr /Ieg,-iindcl Silld, alls 
ihr slcml/r/ell:' Wobbermin, Geschichle lIIul Hislorie, 19. 
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that llwse elem,lltruths of C;esc!lidlte cannot be proved or disproved by 
historical rese,lrch: 
Lkrl1,d truths of this type, ciS OUI' statement SelYs, cannot be proved 
through il1llividu,d historicell cognitions. Because all historical 
rcsc'Jr..:h continues in the form of individual historical cognitions, 
these clern,d truths c,\I)not be proved through historical research. 
i\nd therdme tluths elf this type belong to Ceschiellle; they are 
to be ,kscTihed elS truths of Gesellichle. Indeed, in no other way 
thelll In Cc.,clliclile und through Ceschic:llie do such truths come to 
hUIll,ln b"illgy"! 
Wobbcrmin dews not olfer an analysis of Lessing's entire argument 
in Oil II'l' Pmolol tile Spirit Oil£! of Power. H,)d he done so, he might have 
rl\llized how close his position tlnally is to Lessing's in many important 
respects. Ivlost significantly for the purposes of this study, Wobbermin, 
perhJps without realizing it, wants to avoid the same dangers as Lessing. 
l.essing's primMy cOllcern is to make the religiolls message available to 
modern men and women without requiring them first to make an in­
\elleClu,11 sacrihce by belieVing secondary historical accounts of dubious 
eVc:llts occurring ill the distant past. This is Wobbermin's concern as well. 
l11e ditferences between their positions finally appear in their respective 
solutions to the prohlem of religiOUS appropriation rather than in their 
identilicJlion of the l)rohlel11 itseiLoJ 
jly[artin Kahler 
Paul Tillich, one of Kiihler's last surviving students, rdlected on Kahler's 
theologiC<11 legacy ill his foreword to the English translation of Kahler's 
Tilt: So-colle,l UistoriCllI Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ. Tillich re­
memhers Kiihler as a "strictly systematic thinker who developed his ideas 
52..' ElVi~c' W"JrrJreitm clieser Art, sagt dU111l <llsu uliser Sa/z, kOliliell d(creh histo­
risthe J-:'illzdakellllillisse lIidlt /JelViesCII werdell. Sie kOllIlell folglich, 01,1 cllle his/orische 
ForSc!llllcg ill der Forlll hislurischer E"lzderkelllllllis verlJlljr, iiberhaupt nichl dr/reh 
I,is(oris(he forsdllcllg /JeIVicsell ll'erderL lI",/ cluch gehorell vVahrheilen dieser Art der 
Cesdll,hte Oil: "Is C;eschichISIV"hrheileJl sind sie w beuichJleJl. Ja gar nichl anclers als 
ill ,kr C;es, hid/le Wid aLlS der Geschichle kOll/II1eJl so/che WahrheiteJl 'lil den Menschen 
iIawL'· Ihid, 1~-1(). 
53 l'c:rh'lps the later 'Hohberll1in would have found even more support in Lessing's 
proposells, specifically as 'Hohher-min devdoj.Jed the rdigin'j.Jsycl10logical circle j.Jrecisely 
(yc'l LlIlconsciously wilh regard I,) Lessing) to hridge all three of Lessing's ditches, the 
··tcmpor,JI·LI..:ILlal:' the "metaphysical," and the "existentiaL" 
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under the principle of the Reformers - 'justification through faith by 
grace;" and as a scholar with a "profound insight into the problem of the 
historical Jesus in the light of the scholarly research inlO the sources";; 
Bearing in mind the intention to think systematically under the guidance 
of the doctrine of justification through faith by grace, Kahler's primary 
concern in these essays on the historical Jesus and the historic, biblical 
Christ is to win an "invulnerable area" [sturn/Feit::; GelJidj" for faith, 
kicking away the t~llse supports for faith in order to give faith its proper 
object: Christ the Lord. 
According to Carl Braaten, Kiihler's guest for an invulnerable area tt)r 
faith is defined by two interrelated questions: How can the Bible rem,lin 
a trustworthy and normative document of revelalion when historic,ll 
criticism has shattered confidence in its historical reliability? And second, 
how can Jesus Christ be the basis and content of Christian faith whell 
historical science can never provide indisputable, certain knowledge of 
the historical Jesus?;6 
Kahler sets out to answer these questions by means of a l\vo-Il.)ld 
argument. First, he attempts to secure Jesus Christ as the basis and con­
tent of Christian faith in face of historical doubt by drawing a distinction 
between the historical Jesus [der historische Jesus] and the historic Ch rist 
[der geschichtlidle Christus]. Second, on the basis of this distinction be­
tween the historical Jesus and the historic Christ, he attempts to mainl,lin 
confidence in the authority of Scripture by equating this historic Christ 
with the biblical Christ rather than with the historical Jesus lying some­
where "behind" the texts of the New Testament. 
At work behind these arguments is a profound pastoral sensitivity to 
the situation of lay Christians, the great mass of those who do not possess 
the capacity or the training to engage in complex historical-critical in­
vestigations of the New Testament in order to discover the "real" Jesus in 
whom they should believe. 57 vVere this erudition necessary for Christian 
54. Tillich, forewnrd to The Su-wlled Historical Jesl/5 cmd tile His/uric Bi/Jlic,,! Clilis/, 
by Marlin Kahler, vii. 
55. This catchword, "invulnerable area:' has become synonymous with K<ihkl.'s en­
tire theological j.Jroject, eSj.Jecially in terms of the problem of faith and history. Sec, e.g, 
13rachmann, whose chapter on Kahler is entitled ·'Das 'Slurmfreie' Gc'biet des (;laubens 
bei Martin Kahler." Brachmann, GIL/live Wid Geschichte, 22-26. 
56. Braaten, introduction to The So-called Hislorical JeSIlS, lO 
57. This j.Jaslllral sensitivity is onen more torrnully expres,ed in the desire for cerlain­
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f'lith, Kahler nOles, there would have been no true Christians for almosl 
seventeen cenluries, and there would be very few true Christians even in 
his own day: 
III (.-:111 isl i,1I1S Iivi JIg before the ad vent of hisrorical-crit ical schohH­
shipJ cOlllt'J1If,!ated ,llld I-vorshipped the jesus of the Gospels in just 
Ihis obsllllily \·vhich [hist<)riansj profess to rind in these texts and 
tecl bound to I'emove, then indeed they would not have known 
their Savior. And so it wnukl be fnr all Christians after them, right 
u fl 10 liS. :'h 
'I he situdlion is nut as dire as this, of course, as Kahler insists that 
lhe }c:sus of lhe historians is not the "real Christ" at all, but a figment of 
the historiallS' inlaginations-"J The entire Life offesus movement,"') Kahler 
u)Illellds, "collLe,lis from us the liVing Christ."'" It is a real and present 
danger to the faith of Christians and must be rejected. It is, Kiihler argues, 
a "hlilld ,liley."o! l~ut d blind alley very often appears to be the correct 
roule; otherwise nu ,llle would travel it at all. There is something legiti­
male abnul the "quest (or the historical fesus:' dnd Kahler finds its legiti­
111,1Cy ill the critique o(an abstract dogmatism that threatens to conceal or 
obliteJ'ale the humanity of Jesus. The quest becomes illegitimate as soon 
as it falls into the error of regarding Jesus as nothing more than a mere 
Iy ICe)l'i!i!te;11 thOlI permcalcs Kjhkr's work. For nn analysis of the problem of certainty 
il) r;,1I1kr's work, SeC Mcnckc, Erjilflrllng wltl Gn"ip!tcit des C/(/lIbcns. 
5x. ~jhkr, Dcr sogcl/(/l/l/!e 1,;s!ori;c!Je jesL/s, 61 rET The So-wiled Historiw/ /estIS, 
nil 
59 Il);d, 5511:1', 551 
60. '1 hC'l' Olllcmpis dt ,) hisloricdl hiography or ksus Me chronicled ill Schweitzer's 
(;,'st!lidlle tic! l.elJcl/,!<:slt·Forsc!lIltlg [1::T: 'I hL Quest of the Historical JesusJ. The Quest 
for the Hi,loricdl Jesus l'eell1Lrged in the middle oflhe I;vcnlieth century inlhe so-called 
"Second l,)ue,t" induguraled hy Lrnst Kiisemann and others. See Robinson, A New Quest 
of I/IC flii(uriC,11 /c,w, dnd Harwy and Ogden, ""Vie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem 
hi'lurischen JesuS'I" [ET: "How Ncw is Ihe 'New Quesl f,)r lhe Historical Jesus'?"]. 
fll K:ihkr, Dcr sugCI/(IIII1!C It;storiid,e j"s//s, 44 [ET: The So-calleJ Historical /es//s, 
ell I 
62 Ihid,.p [LT, 46). 'I he term Kahler uses here is "Holzweg:' which is lilernlly a 
"logging road" or "Ioggc'r's path," ,1 rough path in the rore:>! lhat is difticulllO travel and 
oflcn simply cnds, Icadillg nowhere. In CLtman it can refer 10 anything that leads to 
C'Hlfusioll llr to Jnylhing that is misleading. It can he expressed in J variety of English 
idioms, including "barking up the wrong tree," "being on Ihe wrong track," or "leading 
Sllineonc up the garden palh." Hraatcn translales it as "hlind alley," which is a meaning 
c1o,;cr III the origindl, litLtdlmeaning of Ihe Cerman. 
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rnan 63 In other words, in reacting against the perceived DoceliSIll of ,1n 
abstract dogmatism, the Life ofJesus movement falls prey to a subtle (or, 
in some cases, not so subtle) Ebionitism. 
The fatal flaw of the Life of Jesus movement, according to K~lhler, is 
its failure to recognize the unique character of the biblical texts. '[he mod­
ern biographers of Jesus approach the gospels as historical documents 
of an equal value as all other historical docu£llents alld expecl to find 
objective, unbiased sources for reconstructing the personality and life of 
Jesus of Nazareth. Kahler rejects this presupposition and argues IhM 110 
such objective, unbiased sources are available in the New Testament, and 
that there are therefore no sources in the New Testament adequale to the 
task of constructing a reliable historical biography of Jesus. Or as K~ihler 
puts it: 
We have no sources for a "Life of Jesus" thai J historian can ac· 
cept as authentic and sufficient, J stress: for a biography of Jesus o( 
NazMeth according to the currently accepted standards of his tori­
cal scholarship. A credible picture of the Savior for believers is a 
completely different thing6~ 
It is the method of historical research itself that leads Kahler to this 
conclusion. The gospels exist in almost total isolation, so that nothing 
else is known of Jesus of Nazareth except what is contained in them. 111e 
gospels cannot with any certainty be traced to eyewitnesses. The gospels 
themselves only tell us about select periods of Jesus' life. Finally, even 
within the New Testament itself there are two radically different types of 
gospels (synoptic and Johannine), and these often contradict one another 
(to say nothing of the contradictions within the synoptic tradition itself)."s 
Any hope of producing a comprehensive and accurate historical biogra­
phy of Jesus of Nazareth from these sources alone is a slim hope indeed. 
What one finds, instead, is a "vast expanse of the ruins [Triill/merjddj of 
ind ivid ual trad itions:'66 
Alongside the problem of adequate sources, another problem faces 
historians who wish to compose a reliable, accurate biography of fesus 
of Nazareth. One of the hallmarks of the historical method is the use of 
63. Ibid, 47-48 [ET, 46-471. 
64. Ibid., 49 [ET, 481
 
65 Ibid. [ET, 48-49]
 
66. Ibid., 49-50 lET, 491. 
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the llrinciple of an,l!ogy. 'rhe historian must find all analogy in current 
human evenls or experience in order to explain what is difficult or ob­
sUIre in the past, and here the biographical task breaks down. Faced with 
so many gaps in the supposedly historical record of the life of jesus, the 
Illolkrll hislori,1I1 is fl)rced to find an analogy in his own life or in human 
Iile in gelleral, so thai "it is mostly jesus being refracted through the spirit 
of Ihese gentlemen lhemselves."6i What is typically produced is a jesus in 
the inlage of the hisllllian, the Jesus he has hoped to lind from the outset 
of his research. 'Ihis )csus, then, is supposed to be the object of Christian 
,",lith. Bra,lten suggests Ihal Ihis use of the historical-critical method to 
secure the object or faith is finally J subtle form of works righteousness: 
111 krills of lhe rd;)I"\11atioll !;ic) JOdrille of Justification by grace 
aloJll', through t'lith ,.IIOIIC, ill the Word U/OIIC, the actuality of 
salv'llion is not dq)enc!cllt L1pon the preparatory works of man, 
whether 111(ll"al, religiOUS, or intellectual, whether philosophical or 
historical."o 
'Ihere IS a further Ilaw inherent in the application of the principle 
of analogy to the biblictl sources concerning jesus. According to Kahler, 
modern historians (whether they are conscious of it or not) are looking 
for a jesus who resembles them, their 1110ral and religious sensibilities, 
and their Lei/geist. This bias requires them to search for a jesus who is 
fundamentally like all other hUl11an beings. While jesus is like all other 
human beings by virtue of the humanity he shares with them, he is, more 
importantly, utterly unique in hUll1an history: he is the silliess Son ofGod, 
unlike all other hLlll1an beings in kind and not only in degree 69 TIlOse 
who seek jesus in order to see the Father through him (John 14:9) do not 
seek him because he is like them, but because he is radically unlike them. 
Or as K~ihler puts it, "I am not seeking someone like myself, but rather 
my counterpart [Cegenstiick], my completion [Ergiinwtlg], my Savior."io 
07. [hId, 57 [LT, 571. Kihler's crilicism of (he use or the principle of analogy in 
historicrl-critical analysis of the New Test,lInent is quite simrlar to the posilion later 
takcn hy Wollharl I'anncnhag. See Panncnberg, "Herlsgeschehw unJ Geschichte" [ET: 
"1~edcmpLive Lvcnl and 11 ISIO\")''' I. 
68. IlraalclI, "Christ, raith, and History:' 47. Emphasis in original.
 
0'). Kihler, Va sogellwllile Izis(orisdle !esus, 53 [ET: TIle So-called Historical Jesus,
 
70. Ibid., 5') 11'.1', 5')1. 
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This Jesus is not the historical jesus of modern biography, but the hisloric 
Christ, the revelation of God. 
Historical science, no matter how faithfully and thoroughly elll­
ployed, cannot provide this historic Christ for faith. The historic Christ, 
the Christ of the Bible, COIlles to people not through the "midwifery 
[Hebanll1lenkiinste] of historical research,"71 but through the preaching of 
the church. The real Christ is the Christ who is preached, and this Christ 
is the Christ offaith?! 
Here the distinction between the historical [historisch] and the his­
toric [geschichtlich 1 is cruciaL For Kahler, the historical Jesus is jesus as 
he is known by historical research. The historic Christ, huwever, is the 
earthly Jesus in his significance, as he is the ohject of faith.'\ Kiihler is so 
unwilling to "go behind" the texts of the New Testament thai he is unwill­
ing to make allY distinction at all between the historic and the biblical 
Christ; the historic Christ is the Christ of the Bible?' This Christ is the 
Christ of apostolic preaChing, the Christ who awakened failh in the dis­
Ciples alld who is therefore confessed as Lord. He is, according to l\jhler, 
the originator of the biblical picture of Christ, the basis and the conlent 
of faith. 
The identification of the historic Christ with the biblical Christ raises 
serious difficulties for Kahler's position. Most importantly, Kahler seems 
ultimately to be unWilling to grant historical criticism any Significant role, 
even though he repeatedly denies this charge.75lfthe historic Christ is the 
Christ of the whole Bible, then it is difficult to determine how and where 
historical criticism might gain a foothold for its work. New Testament 
scholar Georg Strecker makes a similar observation in an essay on the 
historical and theological problem of the "Jesus question": 
7l. IbiJ., 18 [ET. 1211.
 
n Ibid., 66 [ET. 66]
 
73. Given the imporlance of this dislinction for his argulllenl, it is sllrprising th'lt 
Kihler nowhere offers a clear Jetlnition of these lerms beyond their immediate rckv'lIlcc 
to the topic at hanJ. It is especially interesting to nOll', too, lhat K;ihler rard)' Jistln­
gUishes between Ihe nominal forms Hisrorie anJ Geschichre. ., he Jislinction <'Xi,ts (0\" 
him almosl soldy in the aJjeclival forms historiidl anJ gesdlichtlidl, anJ unly with rckr­
ence to jesus Christ. 
74. lbiJ, 86 [ET, 86J. 
75. Kahler claims to have accepleJ historical inquiry int<) the New "["cstamcnt texts 
"for cerlain purposes:' anJ accuses Ihose who Jeny that he has any positive use 1",,, his­
torical criticism to have misunJerstooJ him. IbiJ., 20 lET, 124]. 
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An 1I1Kri ticJ I 'Hloptioll of I(jhl cr's position should be impos-
sible Silh':C IllS ,1llc'lllpt to li bera te theology fro m th e probability 
jud gm c ilt s ()I th e hi s tur ica l-c ritical metho d did not face LIp to th e 
lju es tioll o( the theol'lgic al right, all d the theological n ecessi ty of 
hi , toric,ll c ritici snl. As a lit er,lry entity, th e biblical witlless 
01- th e hi , to ri" C hrist c<1 un ol be exc lud ed from furth er hi sto ri-
,-a l-c rlticd illljlllry Ahove a ll. however, a deci sio n to ignore the 
hist or ic,li -u itic,ll framing of the qu es tion would be, th eologica ll y, 
,I f)lOblen1.11i ,:,lI f;lilure _ It would not take into account the und er-
stalllllllg ul ' l-calit y whi ch und e rlie s the hi s to rical-criti ca l method , 
nu l' th e sc l( und e rs ta nding of th e m od ern wor ld ge ne r,dl y_76 
Nevertheless, K;ihler is Illore concerned to il liow the histo ric, bibl ica l 
Chri st tll co nfront re,)ders and hearers o f Scripture direct ly than he is to 
m,) il)l<1in <l ny independence o r va lidil y fo r hi sto ri ca l criti cism. 
'1 he hislori ca l Jesus is of no interest to faith; thi s much Kahler makes 
dhso lutely cieJL ' 1 he hi sto ri c Chri st, th e Christ o r th e Bible, is the object of 
C hri slidn Llith, dva ilahle tll eve ry person in every time and place through 
the church's pmchlilldtion of Christ ,1S Lord. But there is iI third category 
operati ve in K~ihl e r's lrea tillent , nalllel y, the suprahi sto ri c [iibergeschich-
Iliclt] "0' 'I he sLiprah isto ric, according to Kahler, designates th il t which 
wo uld nol ex ist ,)part tro m histo ry but whose signilicance is not ex haust -
ed within th e confines of th e histor ical nexus. Tn the suprahistoric, then, 
"w hat is uni ve rsa lly va lid is Joi ned to the hi stor ic to beco me an efFective 
presen ce [Wirksilll/-Gegellwartigellj ."7B 'The suprahisto ric C hrist is Christ 
in hi s immediat e signifi ca nce and presen ce for humanit y, who is always 
re ld ted to the hist o ri c C hrist but never limited to his histor icity. Kahler 
co nt end s that hi Slo rical research is incapable of prod ucing this supra his-
70. Slrcckcr, ''' I hc HislorlC,t1 dnJ '1 heol og ical Problem of the jesus Queslion:' 20 2. 
77_ Ilradlcll tr~ll s l,llcS '\ihcrgeschichllich" as "suprahistorica l" ratha than "suprahi s-
IOrlC," which r~li l s 10 cl ,nvcy Ihe mea ning K(i hler interl(kd. Th e suprahislori c, for Kii hler, 
is rel ,ll cd to Ihe hi sto ric and lIot to th e histo rical at all. To Irans late "iibcrgeschichtl ich" as 
'\ uprahiSlll n cal " simpl y adds ullllece,sdfY cOllfusion to the issue. 
71l. Ka hler, Ocr sogellwJIl/e historische /eslls, 48, n. 1 I ET: The So -called Hi storical 
JeSIIS, ~ 7, 11. 21. ['llr morc Oil Ihe sup rah isto ri c in Kiihler, sec HagglunJ , "Martin Kiihl ers 
leo n Olll del (l\'cr hiSi onska i kr istcnJomcn" anJ l.eipold, 0Jfimbamllg Wid G<!schichte als 
Problem des Vcrs/ehells, cspeci all y C hapler -I, "Der Begriff Jes Obergcschichrli chell." Fo r 
,I slighll y dlflCre ll! apl'l'<)dch Ih 'lIl Kahler's, see Di bdius, Geschichtlidle W Id iibergeschich-
tl,d,e Relig ioll dnJ BlIllinan n', revit:" ', "G.:schichtl ic hc und ubergeschichtliche Religion" 
II :T "Hisl,)ri(dl a llJ Supra-hi sl ori ca l Reli gion ill Christianity"\, the English translation 
01' whi ch ~I ,o aJds to Ihe confusion b), transhlting gesdlichtlich as "hi storica l." 
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tori c Christ because the suprahisto ric Christ transcends histor y and is no t 
limited to the chilin ofcause and effect determinative of tlorIllal hisI Oric.t1 
development. Christ's "histo ric-suprahi storic efFect " is present ,Ind el-Yec-
ti ve within the church, in it s confession of t~lith, and in the li ving {~lith or 
Christians themsel ves. 79 In other words, the suprahistoric Chr ist is only 
present to faith and therefore cannot be provided by histo rical research.·'lI 
Braaten also no tes the imposs ibility of direct histo rica l knowledge 01' the 
su prah isto rie: 
Fa ith which li ves on ly ill histor y can be reLlt t' d to the slIpr,lhi s tori-
cal revelatiollal reality because this rea lit y has ent e red into hi stor y 
and is now knolv able excl USively thro ugh hi s tory . . _ . C entl;li sc i-
ence can d ea l with the s uprahi s torica l onl y indi rec t ly, n;lllle ly, by 
ana lyzing the words and s tatements that have beell translllltted in 
the docum e nts of redemptive hi stor y, and by taking dClOlillt o f th e 
hi storical e ffec ts of these s tateme nts in histol')'."' 
Despite the wide-ranging implicati o ns of a further distinction be-
tween the histori c and the suprahistoric, Kahler dOes not explore those 
implica tions in his essays on the distinction between the historica l Jes Lls 
and the histo ric Christ. Had he done so, he might have avoided o r at least 
more success full y defended his position aga inst the charge of failure to 
grant historica l criticism access to the biblical picture of Jesus Christ. He 
clea rl y moves in this direction by defining the bibli cal texts variously dS 
se rmons, confessions, or testimonies rather than mere hi sto ri ca l docu-
ments, as such ultimately remaining unafFected by historica l inquiry, but 
his fililure to make a stricter distinction betwee n the hi stor ic Christ of 
the Bible and the suprahistoric Christ as the immediately present and ef-
fi cacious Lord keeps his position open to ch<lrges of biblicism, however 
unfair those charges ultimately may be. 
79. Kahler, Del' sogellamlle hisforische JeSIIS, 94 I FT: The So-wllcd flis /oricill leS/I .' , 
95 1· 
80. 111is is so, LeipolJ suggests, because fo r Kahl er th e supra hi storic ori ginaks ill 
and is available through revelation alone. Chri st, in his signilicallce for failh (i.c, as i1w 
revelati on of God in history) , represents the act ual ( Oil lent of the cOllcq)1 of Ihe supra -
historic. It is utterl y unique as Chris! is ulterl ), uniqu e, and ils usc, espcclally in K:ih kr 's 
J og mati cs, is limiteJ 10 descriptions of the wnlen! of sa lvalioll , th e recollcili,lIion of 
the worlJ 10 God and the jll stitication of sinners. Leif-lold, OJ/en/z"nlllg 1I11l1 Ge;cilichfe, 
98- 107. Kahkr refers rea Jers 10 his dogma tics for III ore on the concept of the sllpr<lhi s-
tori c. See Kahler, Die Wissen schajt da christlichen Lehre, ~ 13, 13- 15. Kahle r give, !he 
saille J di llit ion there as he J oes above. 
8 1. Braa ten , "Chri st, Faith , alld History," 89 -90. 
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As it sta nds, Ka hl er is co ntent to eq uate the hi sto ri c Christ with 
th e bihl ic,l l piL"l ure o( hi m ,1nd to loca te th e efficacy and the prese nce of 
Christ in th e church's proc lamatio n of him as its Lord . By removin g the 
bibli cal pict u re nf th e hi storic Christ fro m the rea lm of crit ica l histor ical 
ill ves tig clt in l1 , and by lay ing bare the revelat.o r), charac ter of this picture 
,1 III I it s c() llli llllin g presence in the proclamation of the chu rch, Ka hler 
hopes I U hi1ve sec ured il n invulnerah le area for faith in Christ. 
But 11 ,lS he succ.:eded in establ is hing and protecting thi s in vulner-
ahle arL',l (or fil ilh ? b h is pns itinn fi nall y impervious to <l thoroughgoing 
hi st< )ri c,li c riti cis m n i" th e sources? Wilhel ill Brac hll1ann , fo r exa mple, 
co ncludes th at !:-:. ;ihl er was un successrul in his attempt to es tablish thi s 
in vuln eril bl e Mea 1l"<lC hlll <l lln suggests th at the weak ness oflGi hle r's po-
siti l) n is his rei i ,111 ce on the Easte r exper ience of the disc iples as the o ri gin 
of tes t im nny ahuut th e ri sen Christ, an ex perience th at Kahler sugges ts is 
ti ldly ol' a sup rahis tol'ic rea li ty. Despite K~i hler 's insistence that thi s event 
is Slll)rahi stur ic r,lther th an hi stor ic, the ex perience itself neve rtheless 
occlirs within history. Accord ing to Brachm ann , then, one must recko n 
with th e possihility th at a hi stor icc1 1 expl anat ion wi ll be found fo r what 
Kii hl er insis ts is a suprahisto ric reality. O r as Brachma nn puts it , "a mortal 
dan ger threa tens K~ihl e r 's thesis of an invulnerabl e area fo r fa ith from the 
side ur h istll ry."Xl 
Pe rh aps [,;ihle r's sho rtcom ings can be attributed, at least in part , to 
two related ch,lrac teris ti c feat ures of his theological wo rk: his sllspicion 
of hi sto rica l cr iticism .1S it is applied to theolog ica l work and his Hirta-
tio n with an un criti cd l bibli cism. His suspic ion of h is to ri ca l criticism and 
its ro le in Ih eologicd l wo rk hinders its important nega ti ve func tio n in a 
theological <lnc1 lysis of th e New Tes tamen t. Kahler fears stum bli ng o nto 
a slipl)e ry slope if histor ica l criti cism is permitted free and unres trained 
access to th e bibli C<l l tr<ld it io n, and he co nstructs his invulnerable area fo r 
faith in ord er to pro tec t bo th faith and the Bible from all Y unnecessa ry 
incurs ions by hi stor ica l cr iticismS} 
~2 , Ilmch lll .1I1n, GJ..lldN Wil l GeScilichk, 21\. 
tU , IIraa te n addr~s$cs Ka h k r's alti tud e towarJ hi stor ica l u il icism in the int roJuclion 
tll hi s tnllb la tion el f pa ri or Kahkr's Der stJge/ll./rIrI/e historische /esl/S, b ut he Joes no l 
reach Ihe saillc co nclusi()n reg'lrdi ng K,ihkr's suspicio ns of unrL's trkteJ histor ical cri ti -
cis lll , Scc IIrda tc n , " lnt rodu cl i()Il ," 261f. 
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Wobbermin's Apprai sa l and Critique of Kahler's Positi on 
Wobbermin's pos ition would appear to he quite close to Kii hler's, espe-
Ciall y in term s of the importance of a d isti nction betwee n Gescit icittl!. ,1I1d 
Historie. Wobbermin praises Kahler for so effecti vel ), expos ing the "blind 
all ey" of the Life of Jesus movem ent , both in terms of the lilllit s o( hi s-
tori cal knowledge in general and of hi stori cal inquiry into the gospels in 
parti culM. Wobbermin agrees that the entire Life of Jesus movem ent is ,1 
blind all ey, insofar as it attempts to prov ide dn endurin g foundation for 
Christi an faith in the results of its resea rchs < 
On the surface, eve n Ka hler's and Wohbennin's di stinct ions het wee ll 
Geichichte and Historie appear to be identi cal. For both ,- the hi stll ri c,d 
Jesus is the Jesus of modern histori ca l biograph)', the product of historic11 
investiga tion of the biblica l tex ts. The histo ri c Chr is t, 0 11 the other hand , 
is the Savior who con fron ts readers and hearers of th e New Tesl,lI11 ellt d i-
rec tly, without what Kiihler ca lled "the mid wi fer y of historica l rese'l rch." 
To base fa ith on a product of histori cal sc holarship is to require d blse 
foundation fo r faith , to make faith dependent on the relat ive and proba ble 
result s of histo ri ca l scholarship and on the author it y of hi stori alls rather 
than the li vin g Christ. 
Wobbermin parts co mpa ny with Ka hl er, howe ve r, O il the defini tio n 
of the histor ic Christ. Ka hle r insists th at there is no distinctio n at ,111 be-
tween the histo ri c Christ and the Chri st of the Bi ble ; he is cia gl!.Scl lich-
tfiche, bibfische Christus. Wobbermin is unwilling to eq u<lte the histor ic 
Christ with the bi bli ca l Chri st, instead insistin g th at th e histori c Chri st 
is a narrower fi gure than the biblica l pi cture of him . Wohbe rmin does 
not obj ec t to the fac t "' th at' Ka hler id entifies the histor ic with the biblica l 
Chri st, but to 'how' he does thi s."s5 Th e histori c Christ is the biblica l Chr ist 
fo r Wohber min as well as fo r Kah ler. But the bibli ca l Christ, Wobberill in 
argues, ca nnot simply be equated wi th the hi stori c Chri st as if there we re 
no distinc tio n betwee n the two. 
A thoroughgoing hi stori cal criti cism will clarify the pic ture of the 
historic, biblical Christ so th at only those elements th at are "truly" his -
toric will remain . Kahler, Wobbermin argues, was un able or unwilling to 
carr y hi s distinctio n betwee n Geschichte and Historie to its log ical cO ll cl u-
84. Wobb~ rl11il1 , Ge:;ch ichte ulld His loric, 21. 
85. "Nicht 'daft' Kah ler, sOlldortl 'die Art, Ivie' er dell ge:;chidli liche ll 1111 .1 derl bil,/i:;dlell 
Chr islil s iden fijiziert , beallstallde ich." Ib iJ .. 22. 
4 3 
FAITII AT THIe: INTERSECTION OF HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE 
sion, ""hich, at least in Wobhermin's estimation, would require a further 
distinction hetween lhe biblical Christ illld the historic Christ. In other 
w()Ids, it is Iwl K:ihler's dehnition of CesciJichte, but rather his limitation 
ol'histnrical inquiry inlO the biblical texts (and by extension his dehnition 
nl' /-lislorie) thai cOllStitules his failure to carry his own distinction to a 
fru itl'ul end;" 
f\ccording to Wohhermin, free and unrestrained historical investi­
gation o(the hihlical picture of Christ would make any wholesale identifi­
C<llion (ll' this picture wilh the hisloric Christ impossible. Whereas Kahler 
conclud<:s that the two Ulnnot be distinguished in any meaningful way, 
Wohbermin conLends that historicdl research finally limits the historic 
Christ to three essential elements: his ethical disposition toward love, his 
Uility or will Illith his heavenly Father, and his elevation to the Father fol­
lOWing Iris surl'ning and deatlr,s7 'I hese three clements alone constitute 
the essent ia I pictu re of tile histnric Christ lhat con fronts Ch ristidns ill the 
New Testament. 
'I he decisive questil)n here is a question of method: how hdve these 
three elcillents of the New Testament picture of Christ been isolated and 
presented as tire essential picture of the historic Christ? Wobbermin in­
tends to isolate these three elements by applYing his distinction between 
Geschich!£: and j-lislorie to tire texts of the New Testament. By applying 
lhis dislinctioll to the biblical picture of Christ, Wobbermin intends to 
separate every e1emenl of that picture that is merely historical [hislorischj 
frolll those elements that are considered historically [geschichllich] active 
dnd dhcacious [wirksallli in the Christian tradition and into the present. 
<Jnly these aclive and efficilcious elements are to be considered decisive 
for the hisloric picture of Ch rist. They are not considered decisive on the 
basis of historicli judgment alone, because this would fail to free faith 
from a dependence on the judgments of historians. They are consid­
ered decisive hecause these three elements confront readers of the New 
Testament directly anJ because they continue to represent the decisive 
picture of Christ throughout the history of the Christian tradition and 
into the present. 
oc>. IhiJ., 20-21. 
~7. "".:ill~ ftJlljc/J~ Li~b~;g~;illllllllg ill ihrer R~illh~ic 1Ilid Kraft, ;~itl~ Wi/J~n;eillh~il 
lIlit dem 1llllllllli;clJerI Vuter ulid - mit die;er lelzlererI LIlifs g~l1all~ste zusamlll~lllziirIgelid 
- ;t:i'lc' ErhdlJJllg :lIm Vuler l/LlLh erlilterIc'ItJ Kreuze;tod~: dLl; ;illJ die lvlvlIlerIle, die im 
let:tc'1l Gnllldt: da; BIIJ ,It's ge;,;h;t:htlic/lell ChristllS '/l/;machell." IbiJ., 23. 
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The isolation of these three essential elements of the picture of Jesus 
Christ places Wobbermin on rather shaky ground in strictly hislMical 
terms. He fails to account for the limited historical perspective l)( the 
reader of the New Testament and appears to affirm the possibility of ",h,ll 
Rudolf Bultmann would later call a "presuppositionless exegeSis" (or 
what might also be called "purely objective exegesis").'<~ 'I his limitdlilln 
of perspective - or, to put it another way, the li'ependence on the reader's 
Own historical, philosophical, and cultmal context - is especi,llly clear 
in terms of \Nobbermin's first essential element. In emphasizing jesus' 
ethical disposition tOI·vard love, Wobbermin is dependent on lhe moral 
and ethical emphaSis of nineteenth-century liberal Proteslalltism, which 
was later critiqued by Karl Barth and others as being rooted ill bourgeois 
sentiments or a so-called Kulturprotestl.lI1lislI/us rather than a purely his­
torical reading of the "strange world" of the New Testament. 
But the selection of these three "essenlial elements" also rdiscs the 
question of both the freedom of historical-critical inquiry and the Ir,lns­
parency of its use. vVobbermin consistently affirms his openness to a free 
and unrestrained historical investigation of the New Testament, both in 
order to strip away any false supports tor faith and to allow the truly ef­
ficacious historic elements to remain, independent o( historical research. 
Here Wobhermin's method breaks down, precisely because he insists hoilt 
that he has granted historical criticism free and unrestrained ,Kcess to 
the bihlical picture of Christ and that these three essential elements of tire 
biblical picture of Christ remain unaffected hy historical criticism. These 
three elements, he suggests, are historic because they have remained ac­
tive and efficacious throughout the history of the Christian tradition WJ 
To his credit, he does brietly engage in a historical-critical investigation 
of some pertinent texts to illustrate and support his c1aim."tl BUl he does 
not account for the pOSSibility that continued historical investigation of 
the New Testament might one day cast doubt on the historical reli'lhility 
88. S~~ Builinann, "1st voraussetzungslos~ Ex~g~se Illi\glich?" [ET: "Is Ext:ge~is With­
out Presuppositions Possible?"j. As Buhmann wlllllJ argue a tt:w Jecades laler, presup­
position less ~xegesis is impossible becaUSe tbe ex~get~ is always also a hi~toric ~lIbject 
who stands within the history being investigated and coJlIinu~s to be inlillen,;eJ by it. 
The goal in that cas~ is IlOt to prelenJ one is capable or rr~eing ()nesdr rrllm any "nd all 
presupposilions, but to acknowledge the'se presupp'lsiti()ns anJ to Jo one's exegetic,1 
work wilh lh~Il1 constantly in mind. 
89. This claim on its own is rather Jil'licult to suppllrt in stricti)' hi,tnricalterllls. 
90. Wobbermin, Geschichce 1ll1d Historic', 24-25. 
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of one or 1ll00e of these three essential elements of the historic picture of 
Chrisl, ,1 possibililY that is inherent in the nature of historical investiga­
tion ilself. Wobbermin is conhdent that these three dements will remain 
un'ltfected hy historical investigation, but in this case such confidence is 
aln10si certainly unw<lITanted. 
rLll'lhermOle, it is ironic th<1t 'vVobbermin insists that these three ele­
ments are unalfected hy historical criticism while also suggesting that they 
are provided by historical investigation."1 Here Wobbermin fails to abide 
by his own requiremellt that the historic picture of Christ not be provided 
by historicd rese,lrch Also, it might be true that these three essential ele­
ments oj' the bihlic'll picture of the historic Christ have remained active 
and eiliclcious throughout the history ofChristianity, but it might also be 
true llut they will ce<lse to be so at some point in the future, and that new 
"essenti<ll elements" will emerge on the basis of the continuing develop­
ment of the church ,IS a historic institution and its continui~ use and 
proclamation of Scripture. lhis alone is not sufficient reason to abandon 
these elements, but it is perhdps grounds for a more restrained confidence 
In their perm,lnent 'lnd enduring value alld their imperviousness to free 
hisloricallnL]uiry. 
Wobbermin insists that what is historic is ultimately what is active 
and etticlCious ill history, beyond mere historicity. The key to this insis­
tence is the concept of etticacy or elfect [Wirksamkeit or Wirkul1g]. What 
is histOlical is of interest primarily to historians and is the product of their 
research, while what is historic is eflicacious beyond its mere historic­
ity dnd continues to affect and inHuence the present from the past.91 In 
this Clse, his selection of these three essential elements can be justified. 
Wobberlllin moves beyond Kahler by attempting to distingUish between 
the hiblical Christ and the histOriC Christ both by means of historical in­
vestigation of the New Testament and by means of a preference tor the 
hist,)ric over the historical, the presently efficacious rwirksanr] over what 
91 IhiJ,2·-1. 
92. '1 his Jetillilioll of Ihe etfect or dhcacy of the historic is remarkahly similar to 
Kihler's oCC,,,iOIl,li use of Ihe term "iibergeschichllich." II is quite curious, then, that 
Wohbermill never menlions "<ihkr's use of this tcrm. In his stuJy of faith anJ his­
tory, Wilhelm IlrJChnlanl1 elltitks hiS chapter on Wobbcrmin "Dk ubergeschichtliche 
Wahrheil," eVt'll Ihough Wohhermin himself never, to my knowleJge, actually uses Ihis 
term. llut there ,Ire clear similarllies between Wohberl11ill's unJerSianJing of the ellects 
of hhtory, or the t'ilicacy of the historic picture of Christ, and Kahler's infrequent Lise of 
the term ''suprahistoric." See Brachl11ann, Glclllbe IIl1d Geschichre, 57-61. 
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remains in the past. His position remains open to critique on purely his­
torical grounds, however, which in this case might be inevit,lble given the 
nature of the matter itself, namely, basing the historic effects of Christ in 
some sense on a figure of history, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Wilhelm Herrrm1l1n 
Herrmann did not make a consistent distinction between Geschichle '1I1d 
Historie, yet his work is permeated with the question of faith and histori­
cal knowledge.93 Like Kahler and Wobhermin, Herrl1ldnn operdte~ with 
a strong suspicion of the ability of historical research to provide certdinly 
for faith: 
The decision reached [by historical criticism] nukes a cLlim at the 
outset to nothing more than prObability. Vve are always prep,lred 
for the possibility that our results can be modified by a more pre­
cise consideration or through the discovery of new accounts. It is 
obvious that such a decision cannot provide LIS wilh facts on which 
religious faith could be based.'!· 
Historical judgments are always judgments of prObability, and even 
the highest possible probability is insufficient as d foundation tl)r faith. 
He asks, "What kind of a religion would that be which would want to 
accept the basis for its conviction with the consciousness that it WdS Oldy 
probably safe?"95 According to Herrmann, then, the vdlue of historical 
research in the theological task is its shattering of false supports for faith 
and its continuing comparison of faith's picture of Jesus Christ with the 
results of historical investigation of the New Testament: 
Historical work on the New Testament is not without value for 
faith. In the first place, it shows us how little the New Testament 
texts provide for a historical account undertaking to set forth, as 
a result of scientific evidence, what the person of !eSLIS means for 
the Christian. As earnest historical work on the New Test,lment 
93. See, e.g_, Herrmann, "Der geschichtliche Christus der Crund unseres C\allhens"; 
"Soli es eine besonJere theologische Geschichtsforschung geben ?"; "Warlll11 hedarf lInSLr 
Glaube geschiLhtlicher TatsJchen l "; and "Grund lInJ lnhalt Jc:s GlallIKllS.·' For Ill()re on 
Herrmann's Christulugy, see Sock.ness, "The IJeal anJ the Historic,I! ill the Christol<>gy 
of Wilhelm Herrmann" anJ Greive, Der Grulld des Glallbells. 
94. Herrmann, Del' Verkehr des Chris/ell mit Golt, 57 [ET: The COllllllllrlioll 0/ the 
Christian with God, 69]. 
9S IbiJ, 59 [ET, 72] 
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dt:~lruys such cLlims, it shatters talse supports for faith, and that is 
el great gain. The C1Hisli~ln who imagines that the reliability otthe 
tl'eldilion ~1S historical documents gives certainty to faith should be 
~Iartlecl trom rest by historical work. 'This oLight to make it clear 
thai Christianity cannot be had as cheaply as one thinks. Secondly, 
hisl(1I'ic,d \\'ol'!;. is constantly yielding new and nlOdilled results 
obuined from the tradition. By this ll1e,lIlS the Christian faith is 
constantly called upon to compare the picture of jesus that it holds 
as absolute Il'uth wilh the releltive truth of historical knowledge 
l/li,;/uri,;c!It: L:'rkellllllli,;I. ,-'\l1li this helps us not to forget that the 
l110St illlport.lnt fact of our lite Cdnnot be given 10 us once for all, 
hUI I11U~t he continually grasped \\lith all our souL"" 
\Vhen lhe hlse supports are eliminated, presumably faith has dear 
alld illll11ediale ,lccess to its proper object. AccorJing to Herrmann, the 
basis llrClll'isti~lIl faith is the fact of jesus Christ's appearance in history,97 
Cod's revelation, through whom anJ through which Christians are as­
sured th,lt they coml1lune with God, Historical research is incapable of 
provid ing this U i nJ ubi table fact" [zweifel/ose Tals(lche] of jesus Christ be­
Cduse historical research can only attain higher or lower degrees of prob­
ability. If historical resedrch cannot provide the fact of jesus Christ (IS tlte 
basis o/tiulh to modern men and women, this fact must be appropriated 
by other means: 
If.. the person of kSllS is so certain to us Christians that we see 
in hil11 the b~lsis of clur faith and the present revelation of God 
to us, this conviction is not established by a historical judgment 
[liislorisclzes Urleilj. " [t is sOl11ething else entirely that banishes 
ell! Joubt froill Ihe picture of Jesus. [fwe have that picture at all, we 
have it as Ihe result, not of om own eltorls, but as an effect of the 
power of Jesus hi I11seIC)S 
%. Ihid,()3-o111:'I', 71i-77 I. 
':!7. "Whell \\'e Sf)Clk oflhe historic Christ we mean a uniwr)' personal life that speaks 
to us frulll the New '['ol,llllellt as the disciple; testimony of faith, Dutlhat, whell we hear 
iI, alw,ly' strikes us as a Illiraculous rel'c'ialioll. Thai historical research C,lllnot give us 
thi, we k"ow. Ilut lleither will it ever take Ihis from us by allY of ils discoveries; this we 
believe, the Illlll'e we experiellce what this piclure uf the glory of jesus works in us." Ibid., 
(',1 [LI. 77 7BI 
':!K Ihid., 5':! [I':T, 721 Herrmann names the church - the fellowship of Christians 
- elS the lucus "I'thi, picture's eH'ectiwness. It is through the testimony of Christians that 
Ihe innl'r life ,,( jesus is medi'Hed to others. But, Herrmann suggests, once one has been 
lI11pressed by the p"wer of lhe illner life uf jesus, mediation is 110 longer necessary. Ibid" 
5':!-OO 11:'1', 72-731. 
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Herrmann, like Wobbermin and unlike Kahler, is not Willing sill1­
ply to equate this indubitable fact of the historic Christ with the biblical 
picture of him, For Herrmann there is a necessary distinction between 
what he calls the inner life of jesus [rias innere Leben jesu] and the New 
Testament picture of him. It is possible that many features of the life nf 
jesus presented in the gospels are the product of the evangelis[s' ability [0 
create powerful moral and religious symbols, but for the Christi,tn whn 
has been touched by the inner life of jesus, all doubt vanishes."" For the 
Christian who has experienced the power of the inner life of jesus, histori­
cal criticism no longer presents an)' danger beC<lUse it is the power of Ihe 
inner life of jesus, not the results of historical criticism of the gospels or 
even the New Testament picture of Christ that is preserved in the pre~lch­
ing of the church, that is the basis of faith, 
Herrmann suggests that the personality of jesus cannot be obscured 
or muted by any imperfections or inconsistencies that might appear in 
the evangelists' accounts of his life, The power of this personality shines 
through those inconsistencies and "give[s\ us courage to believe in 
God."IUU It does this at first by the mediation of Scripture, of testimony, or 
of preaching, but once one has been touched by the power of this inner 
life, all need for mediation vanishes and the believer is left with a direct 
experience of the power of jesus' inner life, 
Brent Sockness argues that Herrmann interweaves two distinct 
strands of argumentation in his discussions of the relationship between 
faith and history, First, Herrmann insists on what Sockness calls a "thera­
peutic function of historical critical research," whereby false security is 
destroyed by emphaSizing the fact that faith lives from what is given in 
the present rather than from what in the past is reconstructed on the ba­
sis of historical scholarship, SeconJ, Herrmann appeals not to his[()rical 
99. "Whenever we are actually able to see Ihe p"rsoll of Jesus, Ihen, ullder the im­
pression ot this inner life that breaks through all the veils of the traditioll, we ask 110 
more questiolls aboul the credibility ot the narrators. 'TIle question of whc,ther the person 
of Jesus belongs to history or fiction is silenced in evnyone who !cdrllS to see II at ,111. 
because through il one first experiences what the true reJlity of personal life is." Ihid, 
62 [£1',751. For a study ot Herrmann's lheology with an emphasis OIl the experic'llce of 
God and the inner life of jesus, sec de Boor's article, puhlished ill two parts as "Der letzte 
Grund unseres Glaubens an GOll." 
100. Herrmann, Der Verkehr, 63 [ET: Comnwnivl/, 71i1. 
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reconstruction of the past, but 10 the certainty of this presently given faith 
itselL 1,'1 
In order to bolster this appeal to the certainty of presently given 
fdith, Herrm'lllil makes d distinction between Jesus Christ as the basis of 
faith (faith's C'rllnd) and Jesus Christ as the content of faith (f~lith's Inhl1/t). 
He undersl,lllds this distinction to be a crucial one, because any confu­
sion in this mdlter Cdn have profoundly negative implications for the 
dOllrine OfJUSlilicJlion by faith alone. In his essay "Grund und Inhalt des 
CLllIbens:' he delines the basis of faith as "the man Jesus Christ."'I)! The 
(()Jltellt of f'lith, on the other hand, is the New Testament picture of the 
historic Christ, which is kept ,dive and tl',lIlsmitted through the preach­
illg of the church. 'I he content of faith is, to use another term, composed 
of (;/I/II!JL'f/S,l!,crliI/lkclI (ideas or thoughts of faith) about Christ. The basis 
is ,dways prior to the content, and the content always presupposes and 
re-presents the basis. The basis itself is the sole fact of the appearance of 
Christ in history dllli the continuing effect of the power of his inner life. 
All else is secondary and is ultimately unnecessary for the faith of one 
who has (llready been touched by this power. Ifone were to be brought to 
faith by the content of faith, by the Glallbensgedl1l1kef/l1bollt Christ rather 
than the power u!Christ himself, then faith \"ould essentially be thrown 
back upon itself and would become a human work rather than a free 
gift of the gr,lcious Cod. Harmann argues that his distinction between 
the basis of t',lith and the content of faith places him firmly within the 
Refllrlllalion tradition clnd protects his position from charges of works 
righteousness. III I 
'I h is d isti nct ion marks a signi fican t departure from Kiih ler's position, 
!()r example. lIH K;ihler, who was unwilling to distingUish at all between the 
\0 I Sockne", Aguill,.;1 F,,/,.;e Apologetic,.;, 84-85. Sockness draws this conclusion 
bdsed lln 111' an,liysis 1)1' Herrmann's review of Ernst TrodlSch's essay, "Die Bedeutung 
ekr t ;e,chlchtlichkeit )esu fur den Glauhen:' hut these two slrands run throughout 
I krrol<JJlll's \\Iork a=, a \·"hok'. 
101 Herrnldnn, "Crulld und lnhalt des Claubcns," 282. 
103 "With these three senlL'nces I ,jctu,jlly stay by the original Reformalion doctrine 
ufjuslific,llllll1. It is hence pusslhle for l11e te) lake seriously that failh is experienced by us 
Iwt as our ,Mn work, bUI ,jS <..;ud's fret' gift, and Ihat fauh itself is the new life, the nova et 
;I'iri/I.ldlli I'i/u, In which we are redc'etned persons." Ibid., 191. 
IO.j. "~ihlcr \V<l> certainly' awa,'e ot- HerrlT1,jnn's critiCJlle of his positie1l1, hav­
Ing fHlhllShed a rejoinder l\) Herrmdnn in an essay entitled "Crllnd und !nh,jlt des 
(:hristengLllIhens: Deckl sich dec geschichlliche Christus mit dem hihlischen'" included 
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historic Christ and the biblical picture of Christ, was even less willing to 
make a further distinction between Christ as the basis of Llilh and Christ 
as the content offaith. For him, Christ is both the basis and the content of 
faith in exactly the same way: as the total historic, biblical Christ. 
Herrmann, on the other hand, introduces a further distinction be­
tween the inner life of Jesus, which serves as the b'ISis of faith, and the 
biblical picture of the historic Christ, which serves ,1S the conlcnt of that 
faith. lOS One of the keys to Herrmann's position is the concept oflhe power 
of the inner life of Jesus and how this power is rooted in d historic figure 
while Simultaneously transcending its historicity (thus making it, <lCcord­
ing to Herrmann, impervious to historical skepticism). For Herrlll,lIln, 
the question of the reliability or the accuracy of the historical records 
about Jesus Christ is rendered moot once an individual has been gripped 
by the power of the inner life of Jesus. As Claude Welch puts iI, "llw 
question, then, is not what we make oflhe story (by historisch study), but 
what the contents of the story make of US."IDI' Herrrnallil discusses this at 
length in Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott, and one passage in particular 
places his position in a clearer light: 
It is precisely the most difficult thing to comprehend in the historic 
realityofJesus that sets us free from the tradition, because il finally 
imposes itself on liS as some:thing presently etfective on us. Those 
who have found the inner life of )c:sus through the mediation of 
others, insofar as that has happened, have become free even of that 
mediation. They are set free by the significance that the inner life 
of Jesus has obtained for those who have seen it. If we have expel'l­
enced his power over liS, we need no longer look to Ihe testimony 
of olhers to hold fast to his life as some:thing re,jl. We start, indeed, 
from the tradition; but we first grasp the fact that the tradition 
presents us when we have become aware of the enrichment of Oll!' 
in Kahler, Der ,.;ogenWl/lk hi,.;torische Je";Li";, t49-206. 'Chis essay provides much materi,ll 
lor a comparison of Kahler and Herrmann, but that particular line ofinCJuiry lies heyond 
the scope of Ihis study. 
LOS. Tllere is some indication in Der Verkehr that Herrmann ,jlso ,jllempts 10 dilk'r­
enliate between the basis and the contenl of failh on the b,lSis of the' classical di"illClielil 
hetween the fides 'ILiile creditur and the }ide; qua creditLir: '''Ihe suhjective experience of 
the Christian religion cannot he severed from the Ihoughts that in Chrislian dOdrille 
one seeks to formulate as the contents 01' faith. 'J hat experience does 11<11 end in mere 
feding, but comes to its perfection in those thoughts." Herrmann, Der Vake/lr, 38 1FT: 
COllllllunioll,47). 
106. Welch, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 2:52. 
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uwn innt'llife by contJct \vith the Living One.... 'lhe appearance 
of a f)l'I'SOILllily th'lt bccomes visible to LIS in this \VJY absolutely 
cannot be h,lnded over [0 LIS through the communication of oth­
c'rs. 11 ariscs ill LIS as the free revelation of the living to the living. 
'[ hus also the Inner lift: of JesLis becomes pan of our own reality. 
'1lws" who havc eXl)aienced this witl cenainly no longer say that, 
stridly sl)eaking, they can cOl1ll>rehend only the tradition of Jesus 
,IS something rcal. jeSLIS himself becomes a real power to LIS when 
he di,clllses his il]ner life tll LIS, ,] power rh,H we pt'rceive as the best 
thing our lifc c()nt,\ins. ltl7 
'I he (,Ict of lilt' 'l['peardnce of jesus in history is, dccording to 
HelTmdnl\, Ilolhil\g olher than the revelation of God.'I!~ TIle fact of the 
historic )csus Christ, impressing himself upon men and women and 
becomil\g P~lrt of their own reality, is the basis of Christian faith and, 
~1Ccording (0 Herrmann, is impervious to historical criticism. It is based 
in the historic tradition of the New Testament, but it finally transcends 
the n1t.'di'llilln o( history by means of d direct, indeed miraculous effect 
of Christ 01\ the il\dividuaLII!') 'The certainty of faith is thus found in the 
experiel\Ce of this eilect within the individual rather than in any external 
"~)rop. 
vVith this distinctiol\ between the basis of faith and the content of 
faith ,Ind with this emphasis on the immediate effect of the historic Christ 
on the individual, Herrmann hopes to have described a faith that is ul­
timately ul\lrouhled by any historical inquiry into its basis. TIle question 
st iII rem,] ins, however, of how successful Herrman n was in his attempt to 
remove fdith from the vicissitudes of history. 
Unlike Kahler, Herrmann is Willing to grant historical criticism free 
access to the biblical texts. He is free to do this because he does not ulti­
mately base faith on the reliability of the biblical accounts of jesus Christ, 
but rather on the power of the inner lite of jesus that lies behind those 
Il<lrratives. Or as Herrmann puts it, "It is thus perfectly clear that we are 
in a very good position to detach the content of a narrative both from the 
t07. H~ml1~nn, Del' Verkc:hr, 60-6\ [ET: Conllllunioll, 73-741.
 
IOH, Ihid, 40-4') WI', 59).
 
lO'), L1s~whL'r~, ill ,II] ,micle cntitled "Der geschichtlich~Christus d~r Grund Ul1seres
 
<..;I~lIh"I1S:' H~rrlll,]nn cxpli~itly identifies this direct effect of the inner life of Jesus on 
Ih" individu~1 as ~ miracle: "I have emphasized that Christ as the basis of failh bears 
wlt!tnl himself a claim lh'll cxc"eds every human dimensiun and is simply miraculous." 
rkmnanll, "[leI' g~schlchtlicheChrislus:' 164. 
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narrative itself and from its author and to regard it as an element of that 
reality with which we have to come to terms."111! Toconfuse the power of 
the inner life of Jesus with the narratives about that life and thM power is 
to confuse the content of faith for the basis of faith. 
By detaching the content of the narratives frol\1 the nJrrat'ives them­
selves, Herrmann does make great strides toward -enlOving the basis of 
faith from the tluctuations of historical research in t<o those Ilanal ivt's. Hut 
how is that content gained if not by means of the narrdtive? Herrmann 
admits that this must be the case because one nrstl"<lrns of jesus and the 
power of his life through Scripture, testimony, or p,-~aching One linds in 
and through that testimony the basis of faith, the i1I1er life o( Jesus and 
its power as the revelation of God in history. Christians can rest assured 
that the picture of Christ meditated by the church faithfully retlects the 
essence of Jesus of Nazareth, even if Herrmann is lIlwilling to base thdt 
assurance on any historical judgment. He is convinccd thaI the picture l)f 
jesus Christ possessed and handed down by the church is historically dC­
curate in its essentials, but he claims that this is a judgment of faith rather 
than a result of historical research. 
If, as Herrmann argues, the narratives are nece,sary only ,1t an inter­
mediate stage to provide the original mediation for the power of the inner 
life of Jesus to shine through, after which time they are no longer neces­
sary for the one who has been touched by the pm\,el' of jesus' inner life, 
the narratives still have an important role to play. nese narratives might 
provide an accurate, reliable picture of jesus Christ and the power of his 
inner life, or they might, in the end, prove to be unreliable. It is diflicult 
to determine how Herrmann hopes to have made the narratives (and his­
torical criticism of them) irrelevant for providing the basis offaith simply 
by declaring them to be unnecessary once one has been touched by the 
power of the inner life of jesus through the mediatiol of those narratives 
themselves, while at the same time insisting that fait~ nevertheless has an 
accurate picture of the historic Jesus Christ. 
Herrmann's position rests on ""hat Sockness has called a "pseudo­
historical approach:' in which Herrmann "blocks tho p<lth frolll histori­
cal judgments to faith, [but] leaves movement in the opposite direction 
liD, Herrmann, Dec Verkehr, 58 rET: Commllnion, 71). 
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open.""1 Sockness cPllLludes that Herrmann fimlily sutlers from a lack of 
hoth "his\oric,t1 nerve and theological imagination": 
"1I1Clll,)gicdlly speaking, the insistence that the portrait of Jesus 
Illll,;t (aithl'ully rdlect the ,1Clllal man jesus of Nazareth or else it 
is III<:n:/)' .\ licli'Hl or a product of the poetical imagination, and 
thadmc ulltrue, betrays Herrmalln's lack of appreciation for the 
plldical ,llld rqHesent,lti,)lldl ch,lracler and function of the bibli­
cal texts. ll ; 
\rVohhcrmin's Appraisal and CritilJue of Herrmann's Position 
VVohhermin's critique of Herrmann's position is the Illost subtle of his 
trealments of the !()ur theologians he has chosen to engage in his essay. 
WohherIllin's j1,)sition is <ILtually quite close to Herrmann's in many sig­
nificant rcspeds, illcluding the rejection of the capability of historical 
research to l)J'(lVidc the basis ,)f faith, the positive evaluation of historical 
research as a necessdrY means of destroyillg false supports tor faith, and 
the insistence lhat rhere Illusl be some distinction between rhe historic 
dlld the hlhlical Christ (contra Kahler). 
CI hese si m i1Mi lies correspond to some shared weaknesses as well. 
130th are ultimately uncle'lr on the precise nature of the relationship 
hetween the posilive and negative roles of historical-critical research, 
especially vis-a-vis the "inner life" of Jesus or the "essential elements" of 
the piclure of Christ. Both intend to free faith from the vicissitudes of 
history by estahlishing the certainty of faith in the religious experience of 
the etl!cacy (\rVobbermin) or power of the inner life (Herrmann) of the 
hiqoric Christ, yet both maintain that this certainty will withstand rig­
orous historical scrutiny without any justification for that claim beyond 
the continuing existence of the Christian faith. Both succumb to what 
Sock ness cliled in Herrmann's case a "pseudo-historical approach" that 
fails to take seriously the pOSSibility that rigoroLls historical criticism will 
undermine the essential elements of their respective pictures of Christ. 
WobberIll in's critiq ue of Herrmann and the differences between their 
respecrive positions can be distilled into one main point with two lines of 
argument. ft concerns the picture of the historic Christ, subdivided into a 
Ill. So.:kncs>, '''I h~ IJC',ll anJ thc Historical," 386. 
112. Ihid., 3~7. 
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concern about the relationship between the basis of faith and the (oillent 
of faith, and a concern aboLlt the place of the resurrection ill thM picture. 
Unlike Kahler, Herrmann is not willing to equate the historic Chrisl 
with the total biblical picture of him. To do so, HerrrTI<lnn suggesrs, is to 
confhte Christ as the basis offaith (the power of his inner life) with Christ 
as the content offaith (the C/a/./bensgedollkert about Christ). The inner life 
of Jesus shines through these ideas of faith alld' is expressed ill them, but 
it IllUSt be kept distinct. Otherwise the resulting picture of Jesus would 
be vulnerable to historical criticism and would def)end Oil the results of 
historical research, only ever attaining probable reli"bilily rather than the 
certainty of the direct experience of the power of Jesus' inner life itself 
Wobbermin rejects this separation of Christ as the h,lSis of Llith 
and Christ as the content of faith because, in his estimation, it divorces 
the historic Christ from the total historic context by which he becomes 
present to faith. He fears that this separation of the b<lsis and the contellt 
threatens to throw the picture of Christ back into the realm of histori­
cal research and historical judgments, requiring historical verificalion of 
the accur<lcy of that picture before it can become the object of faith. He 
recognizes Herrmann's intention to bypass historiGll judgments by em­
phaSizing the immediate effects of the power of the inner life of jesus, but 
he questions whether Herrmann succeeds in doing so: 
To the extent that the person of Jesus Christ is taken out or the 
total historic context in which he stands, he now becomes, sn to 
speak, a historical figure in a narrower sense, i.e., such a figure 
who is not already ensured b)' Illeans of the tOlal historic colJtext 
in which he stands and to which he is included as an indispcnsable 
link, but rather one who invites historical research and lirsl could 
be ensured by it. l13 
For Wobbermin, the continuing efficacy of the picture of Christ 
within the Christian tradition (the "total historic context"), not historical 
research, is what ultimately authenticates the picture of Christ. Herrmann 
Il3. "In delll lv/afte, als die Persoll lesll Christi aflS <lml gescllichtlidwlI CeS/llllt;;wlllll­
nUlllwnge, ill dem sie stel,t, hernusgellollllllell winf, wird sie ebell ZII eiller ill/ engen'lI 
Sillne so ZlIllellnendell historischell CrojJe, d.h. zu eilla solchell, die niehl 5"1111/ .llIr"l .1(11 
geschich/lichen Cesallltwsanmrellhallg, ill del/l sie ste!1I filld "ell/ sie als /111\'euiujJ.:rI/ches 
Che.l eingejiigt isl, hinreiehend siehergestel/t ist, sOlldall die ZII eiller historisdl(1l De­
tailuntersuehung all.fJordert Wid erst dureh eille solehe sicherges/elII werdell kOllllle." \lVoh­
bamin, Ceschichle und His/orie, 45. Here again is the COIlCCrtl tu dilrercntiatc he'lwc'ell 
the primary character of Ceschichle and Ih~ sCLOl1dary characlcr of Hi,torie. 
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claims th,lt the inner life of jesus elccomplishes this same objective by the 
dteL't o( ilS pllWer, hut Wobhermin claims that this is not possible if the 
inner life lll' ksus is not understood within the larger historic context in 
which lhat \)iclure conlinues to be present and effective, To separate the 
inner life of jesus rrolll the IMger historic context of its efficacy or effects 
is, in Wohhermin's estimation, a Selcritice of the historic character of that 
inner Iilc, 
Wohherillin contends that lhis danger is only latent in Herrmann's 
lle,l[menl bec,lLlse Herrillann does not completely separate the basis from 
lhe content or faith,'14 'IlH~ inner life of Jesus as the basis of faith is still 
handed down through the Christian tradition and is therefore not com­
pletely distinct (rom it. The "totdl historic context" is slill a part of thai 
picture, even ir it is secondary to it and derived from it. 
However, Wohbcrmin argues thelt Herrmann's position succumbs to 
dirliculties because he has not carefully distinguished between Geichichte 
and llis/orie Such a distinction would require Herrmann to rethink the 
distinction hetween Christ as the basis offaith and Christ elS the content 
of raith. Wohhermin argues that Herrmann, by distinguishing between 
the helsis or f,lith ,1Ild the content of faith, requires a historical judgment 
to delennine th,ll h'lSis. Because Herrmann claims that this basis is the 
inner life of Jesus as it lies behil/d the texts of the New Testament and as 
it is distind from what Wobberll1in calls the "total historic context" in 
which it continues to be present and efficacious, Wobberll1in contends 
thM Herrm,lnn is forCed to rely on historical judgments to determine lhe 
chMaCler of Ihis inner life of Jesus: 
Such ,In allempt, according to the nature of the matter at hand, 
can nnly he cMrkd out by means of historical research; where it 
is undertaken, it thus leads to a historical approach in a narrower 
~ense, ~o to speak. Herrmann's position will not be able to elude 
the force of thi~ fact. [n fact, at this point a "hi~torically" oriented 
~erie~ of thoughts crosses his position and destroys it. For along 
with the "historical" series oflhoughts, their relativity, their hypo­
thetical character, and their probability also enter into Herrmann's 
picture of Chri~t.ll; 
114. Ihld .. 4'1. '1 IllS is obvillusly COil t r<lrY to what Herrmann himself insisted. 
115. "Eill solc/ler Vrrsl/eh kllllli llha der NlltLif da Sac/Ie wjolge lIL1r lIIit den /'v(ilteJlI 
hislorisdlCT Forsdllllig 1ll/sgeJiihrt werdell; "'0 er witemollllliell Ivird,fiihrt er also z" eiller 
illl ellgerell Sill II so ZLI lIellllerll/ell historisdlell Bernlclilltngsweise. Delli Zw'ltlge dieses 
Sudlverll,.I!t; >I'm/ sieh lIL1eh Herrllllllllls Positioll lIieht entziehell k iJIIII ell. Tatsiiehlieh wird 
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Nowhere does this difference between Herrmann and Wobberrnin 
come into clearer relief than it does in the question of the resurrection of 
jesus, The decisive question in terms of the resurrect ion is whet her the el­
ement that came to expression in resurrection faith C,Hl he Sel)ar,ll~d from 
the New Testament picture of Christ as a historic fact. While HelTl11,lnn 
wants to make such a distinction, at least provisionally, Wohhermin argues 
that such a distinction must unconditionally be rejected, For Wohbermin, 
"as soon as such a separation is made, the historic picture of Ch riSI ceases 
to be, in our judgment, what it always has been according tl) its historic 
existence and also what it is and means in the present."III' 
In the case of the resurrection the question is not one of Hiitorit: (it 
has been dismissed by the nature of the malter at hand) but is f<1ther ,1 
question of how Geschichte is denned and understood. Because Herrl11,lnn 
wants to distinguish between the inner life of jesus lying bertil/I! Ihe texls 
of the New Testament and the narratives and trad it ion abou/ the power of 
his inner life, Vvobbermin accuses Herrmann offailing 10 account for the 
essential significance of the resurrection for the toted historic picture of 
Christ. 1l1e resurrection is significant precisely because il is presupposed 
by the entire Christian tradition, from the New Test,lment itself through 
to the present day. Any attempt to "go behind" the tradition to the histo­
ricity of the resurrection event itself necessarily requires an inappropriate 
dependence on historical research and historical judgments, which can­
not prOVide any foundation for Christian faith. But whereas Herrmann 
understands this to mean that the resurrection itself should nol and 
cannot constitute an essential element of the basis of faith. Wobhermin 
insists that it must constitute an essential element of the historic picture 
of Christ precisely because the resurrection is presupposed by the entire 
Christian tradition as an event of decisive and enduring (i,e. historic) sig­
nificance and efficacy. 
Again, the crux of this debate on the place of the resurrect ion 
within the picture of Christ is the difference between Herrmann's and 
sie all diesem PUllkt dureh e;l1e 'historiseh' orielltierle Gedllllkellreihe gekreuzt Wid UlII 
iilre Ges"'hlossenheil gebraeht. Denn II/il der '/listorisdlell' Gedwlkwreihe kOr/llllt 1111 vcr· 
meidlich alleh deren Relativitiit, ihr hypothetiseher oder Wahrscheillliehkeils-CilUnlklcr III 
das Herrl1lanl/sche Chr;stllsbild hineir/." Ibid., 42. 
116. "Sobll/d eine so/che TrenllLlllg ernstlieh vollzogen IVird. hiirt }en6 Gild fI.E. LIlI/; 
das Zli seitl, IVas es seinelll gesdli"'htliehen Bestan"e Iladl il1lll/er gewesell lSI, WII;; es >I'il/ell/ 
gesehiehtlkhl'll Bestande naeh afleh geget/lviirligpir lIIlS is! lind bedel/tet." Ibid, 36. 
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Wobbermill's defil1iliol1 of the picture of Christ as the basis of faith. 
Hernnanl1 linlits the essential clements 10 the "inner life" of ksus, while 
Wobberlllin places lhese elements within a wider context, namely the 
!)icture o!' (;hrisl l)reSenl witllin the "total historic context" of the New 
'I'eslalnellt al1d lhe Christian traditiol1. For Herrmann, including the ele­
ments of1he Ir,ldiliol1 in the picture of Christ moves away from the il1ner 
life of Jesus ,IS the b,ISis of faith al1d tow,lrd the Glaubensged<7nken that 
are the (()l1teIl1 l)f failll, and therefore such a move Illust be rejected. For 
Wohbenn i11, IiIn it i I1g the picture of Christ to the inner li fe of jesus in (and 
behind) lh~' New 'J'esl,lInelll [)icture requires historical and psychological 
judgments lhal are ditlicult if not impossible to make. 
Hellm,1I111 does not ,1rgue for a wholesale rejection of the Christian 
lradiliol] il1 ilS significance for the picture of Christ, and Wobbermin 
righ Ily ac kl10wledges th is. Trad itiol1 plays an import,1I1 t role in Herrmann's 
discussion, for Ihe piclure of Christ is present and handed down in the 
lr,ldiliOll lhrough the proclamatiol1 of the gospel. II; But tradition always 
serves as lhe means by which the picture of Christ is represented and is 
l1ever p,lrt oflhat picture itself; it is, once again, a matter of distinguishing 
between the b,ISis offaith al1d lhe content offaith. 'Where Herrmann sees 
a clear distinction between the person of jesus Christ and the tradition 
concerning him, Wobbermin sees a unity.ll" Wohbermin prefers to speak 
of lhe picture of Christ as standing within a much broader historic con­
text, and he accuses Herrmann of rel1loving the person of Christ fro III this 
context. vVubberlllin helieves it is necessary to include the resurrection in 
the historic picture of Christ as the object of faith precisely because the 
It7. "," (:hrlSiiallity Ihere is Ilolhing else COllsislently as necessary as the preaching 
01' Chris!." Hcrrlllanll, Dt'r Verke!u', 1j5 [ET CLi/WIIWlioll, 80]. Herrlllallll also nOles the 
IlllpOrlallCe of trJJitioll ",hen he suggests 'I relationship bet",een the person oflesu> anJ 
apostoliC preaehillg: "We ha"e the person of Jesus only in the preaching of the Jisciples 
who believed in him." Ibid., 93 [cT, 1131. 
II~. f Icrrtll'"1n'S an\1 Wobhermin's conflicting posilions on the rdation Oflhc person 
o( (:hrisl III the Ir,tdilinn COllceril ing him atllicipales a similar lkbalC in the miJJIe of the 
tweillielh century (onccrlling the reldtion of the early Christian kerygma to the procla­
mation of lesns, addressed in the work of RuJolfBullmann, EhcrharJ Ji.ingd, anJ others. 
Sec, e.g., l\lIlimdllll, Dels Verhii!tnis d2r IIrchristlichell ChriSllishotschuft ZlinI hislorischell 
!e>w II'T "'1 he Primitive' Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus"] anJ )linge!, 
PUII!IIS wn! jeSlI$. Wobbcrmin's po>ilion is inlluenccd by Sehleiermacher's, particularly 
SchlcicrmJeher's discussion of Ihe unbroken unity of Ihe influence of the Redeemer on 
the Jiscipks and the teslimnny orhis influence through the proclamation of the church. 
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resurrection has always been included in the picture of Christ, (rot)] the 
New Testament to the present: 
For us it is only a question of whether the element th,lt found its 
expression in resurrection faith is to be sq)arated frol11 the [)ktur<:? 
of Christ that is gIven to LIS frol11 the New Testal11ent as a histnric 
bct, of whether it is to be separated from it at least provisionally, ,15 
Herrmann wants to do. And this question, it ilpp<:?ars tOllS, l11ust he 
answered with an lInconditional no. As soon as such ,I sq)ar,ltion 
is seriously made, that flicture, in our opinion, ceases 10 be what il 
always was according to its continued historic existence and also 
what it presently is and means for LIS according to its continued 
historic existence. 119 
According to Wobbermin, Herrmann's position finally SUCCUI1lbs 
to a dependence on the historisch thinking it seeks to avoid By refus­
ing to include the resurrection in the essential traits of the life of Jesus, 
Herrmann isolates the picture of the historic Christ froI1l the wider his­
toric context of that picture, which, Wobbennin argues, ll1ust include 
the resurrection. By excluding the resurrection from the picture of the 
historic Christ, there is then the temptation of considering the persoll of 
jesus as a historical rather than historic figure, insofar as that picture is 
then limited to the e<1rthly life of jesus. 
\Vobbermin's criticisms of Herrmann remain subtle and limited es­
sentially to the two points described above. Their respective positions are 
finally quite c1ose.I'o Both agree on the necessary neg,ltive role of his­
torical criticism, both question the benefits and even the possibility of 
I 19. "Es Jragt sic'h /iir W1S 1I1Ir, ob VOII dem Christ IIshilde, dus III1S VOIII NeilI'll Tcstamcnl 
her ais geschichtlicller Tatbesland gegebell ist, das I'vloment, dllS im AIl(erstehllngsbhlldlL'll 
sei/1ell AlIsdrllck geJlllldeli hal, iiberhallpt Zli trenllell isl; ob es 1'011 ihlll welllgs!clls vorliill­
fig, !Vie Herrmann lviII, ZII Irenllen isl. Ulld diese Fmge scheilll III1S !1"dillgWlgsios VerJIelll( 
werden Zli miissell. Sobn!d eille solche Trellllllng crJlsllich vollzogell wlrd, h,;rt jellcs Sitd 
II. E. all;; das ZJI seill, was es seinem geschichtlichell Bestelllde IIc.JcI, illllller gcwcsell 1St, 
was es seinelll geschichtlichen Beslalllie nach allch gegenwiirligfiir WIS ist 1I11d bedelllet." 
Wobbermin, Geschichte 1I11d Hislorie, 36. 
120. Wobbermin concludes that his position r<:presents somelh ing of d "Ill iddle Jine" 
between Kahler's and Herrmann's, although he also c1dil11s thdtthis W<lS not his intention. 
He acknowleJges hoth Kiihler's anJ Herrmann's influence, along with Adol!" l-Iarnack~, 
anJ Julius Kaftan's, in devdoping his Ihoughts on the distinction between Geschich/e anJ 
Historie anJ on the problem of faith anJ history Although Wohhermin illlplies that hls 
position falls roughly equiJistanl from Kahler's and Herrmann's, after closer analysis it 
appears that his pOSition falls closer to Herrmann's Ihan 10 Kdhler's. Ibid., 40-47. 
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eqLl,ltil1g; the historic Christ with the tOlal biblical picture of him, and 
hoth cllkll1pllO hnd some certainty for faith independent of the tluctuat­
ing r,,'sults of historical-critical research. l·hey claim to have found this 
certaillty in dilferent places, but in the end their positions suffer from the 
same weclknesses. 130th Herrmann and VVobbermin claim to have avoided 
Ill<lkillg faith dependent on historiczd juogments, but hoth positions are 
more 0l'en to criticism than either is willing to admit. In Herrmann's case, 
by limilil1g the basis of f<lilh to the earthly life of Jesus it is difficult to 
determine how he manages to claim that he has removed faith from the 
vicissitudes of historicdl research. And vVohbermin, by claiming to have 
gu,lr,lntt:ed the picture of Christ by tracing its eltects through the his­
lory of Ihe C1nisl ian trad it ion, is ull imately maki ng a historical judgment 
without 'lllmilting that it is, in fact, a historical judgment. How else but 
by h isl oric,li inqu iry could one hope to isolate the essen tial fealu res of the 
picture of Christ as il is effective and efficacious throughout the history of 
the Christidn tradition? Here again it is helpful to recognize the implicit 
d ist i11Ct ion in 'vVobberm in's essay between Gescltidtle ano its effects or 
efllc<lcy, hut Ihis is a distinction vVobbermin never made explicit. 
Similarly, bOlh Herrrllann and vVobbermin contend that faith can 
conrldenlly dSSUI11~ thdt it has dn accurate picture of the historic Jesus 
Christ, a confidence that is bas~o either in the power of the inner life 
of jesus (Herrmdnn) or the efticacy of the historic Christ within the 
Christian lraoition (Wobbermin). This is anything but a foregone conclu­
sion. 'I he pOSSibility will exist, in both cases, that faith's confidence in the 
historicdl reli,lbility of its object is mistaken. But, as B. A. Gerrish notes, 
"N~ither Herrmann nor Wobbermin, any more than Kahler before them, 
could resist the temptation to move back from the confidence of faith to 
contidenc~ in the historicity of the Synoptic Jeslls."l!1 
1n fdcl, it is difficult to see how Wobbermin has made any Significant 
advances beyond Herrmann's position l !! There are differences, but ulti­
malely their positions are open to the same criticisms, especially in terms 
of th~ role of historical criticism and the extent to which both have or 
have nol avoided lhrowing faith back into the vicissitudes of history. Both 
121. (;erri,11, "Je,;u" Ivlylh, '1nd History," 3'1. 
122. ()Ile advance, which only become'S clear as an aJvance wilh ,om" historical Jis­
lance, IS Wobbl'rmin's Insist"nce thdt the resurrection must belong to the basis of failh. 
·1 he resurreclion and it; significance for faith will become a cenlrallheme in th" Ih"ology 
of the 1111d- Lwentit'lh century, esp"cially that uf Herrmann's stud"nt, Rudolf Bultmanl1. 
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attempt to locate the certainty of faith outside the redlm of historical re­
search by emphasizi ng the im medi<lte preSence and efl1cacy of the piclu re 
of Christ as mediated by the Christian tradition. But this in itself does 
not remove the picture of Christ from the redllll of historical judgments. 
Charles Carlston's criticism of Kahler actually dpplies to Herrmann and 
Wobbermin as welL 
Tht' principlt' [thaI genUinely historicIlfigures ,Ire known til their 
effects) must not be extended so broadly as 10 just ify JII subsequellt 
interpretation of ali historical figures; it IllUst kave rOom !()r a 
negative critical function, judging the concinnity betwt'en the his­
torical personage and later interpretdtion. Neitht'r the Pmtest,lnt 
Principlt' nor serious historical study can survive oth"'rlvise. 
TIle effects of a historical figure Jre, at JedSI in theolT, know­
able by the Sdme methods as the figure himself; a decision of f;lith 
is not called for in winnOwing the Napoleon tradition in POs(­
Napoleonic times. 111e apOStolic understanding of Jesus in this 
sense IS dvailable through historical inquiry.'2.; 
It is only later, with the development of the religio-psychologic.d
 
circle between personal religious experienc~ and the historic et·hcacy of
 
the picture of Christ, and with it the attempt to build on the distinction
 
between Gesehiehte and Historie in a broader and mOre systenlalic Context,
 
that Wobbermin begins to distance himself from Herrmann's position. 
Wilhelm BOUssel 
The fourth and final figure Wobbermin conSiders in his section of ap­

praisals and critiques of previous positions is Wilhelm Bousset. Likely the
 
least familiar of the four figures, Bousset taught at Goltingen ano GieGen
 
and was One of the founders of the religiml;geschichtliche Sd/llIr.:. • His
 
12 1 
123. Carl.,ton," Biblicislll or Historicislll?" 35. 
12~. There is surprisingly litlle lit"rature on Bousset, considcring his r"k in lilllllding
 
th" religioJ1sgeschichtlich~ Schllie. ~ille only CO/llprehcnSive sluJy uf Boussci JS d disserta­

tion by Anthunie Frans Verheu/e entitleJ Wilhelm BOllssd, Leben lind Werk. Vcrhcuk
 
also sketches the COntours of the Jebak' concerning thc distinction bct""t'n Ge:;clliclltt' 
and Historic from Kiihl"r to Pannenberg in an artick entitled "'Historic,' en '(;c'sc!l1chlc.'" 
He brielly Jiscusses Wohbermin's dislinclion as a prt'Cursor qf llUltl11ann's <lnd wonders 
Why \<Vobbermin'$ work ul1lhe JistinctioJl has (101 played a largc'r role;11 Ihe work nf/,lIergt'nt'rdtiuns of theologidJls. 
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l1\ost SigllilicJllt works are historical studies of the origins of Christianity, 
of which Kyrins Unis/ns is perhaps the best known. 125 
At the fifth World Congress for Free Christianity and Religious 
Prugress, held in Herlin in 1910, Rousset delivered a paper entitled "Die 
Kedeulung der Person Jesu fLlr den Glauben."llo In his paper Bousset at­
LelllfHs to Ill;linlain Ihe signitlcClllce of the person of jesus for faith without 
lhrowillg Llith h,lCk illtO a dependence on the fluctualing results of his­
loriel! rese,lrch. He IlHlves rrolll a discussion of earlier attempts 10 solve 
Ihis 11rohlelll (rrom Ihe "older rationaliSIll" to Schleiermacher to Ritschl) 
10 an all;llysis of lhe cOlltlicling assuillptions of science and religion, and 
hlldll)' 10 il conslructive proposal for securing a faith that is not subject to 
the ullcerLailllics of his tori Cd I kllowledge. 
'[1k' prohlelll, as BousseL ullderstands it, is the problem of faith and 
hislory <111(1 their relaliollship to one another. As long as theologians at­
teillpl 10 hase fdith on historic,ll particularities (e.g., the atoning death 
or Christ, Ilis illiler life, or his messianic self-consciousness), faith will 
contillue Lo depend to a gre;lter or lesser degree on the results of historical 
rese;lrch illto his person and work, Bousset is not willing seriously to en­
tertain Drews's thesis that Jesus of Nazareth never existed, but, assuming 
that he did ill lact exist, what Cdn he known with allY historical certainty 
about his person and his work? Not very Illuch, finally: 
\Vhal we kllow of the pragmatiC context of his life would fit on a 
Single shcct or' paper. The [,reaching or the gospel of Jesus is an of­
(Cll insoluble web of conlillunity tradition and possibly authentic 
words of lhe nlJster. 'vVh,1I our gospels hand down concerning the 
uilique sl'lf-consciousness of Jesus and its forms, and therefore of 
the inner life of his personality, is overshadowed by the dogma of 
Ihe c-ol11l1lul1ity. ,,; 
125. I\UlIssl'I, Kyrius ellr;;I"s lET: 1\)'1';"; ellr;;I,,; i. 
12". !l0l1",1, "Ill, lledt'UIUl1g ller Person kSlI nil' den Glauben." Wobbermin 
al", deliVered a palxl' al Ihis congress, enlitled "Aufgab~ und B~delltung del' 
l,(dig1llnsps}'ehulugil'." Olher preselll~rs ineluded ."'dulf Harnack, Hermann Gunkel, 
alld hllsl Trul'lisch. Wubbermin lVas in attendance and heard Boussel deliver his paper, 
alld h, recJl1s Ih,lt h, iml11,di,lIcly IOl1k BOUSSel <bide and remarked Ihal their positions 
M, ultimately quill' cluse in Illany important respects, except for their respective jlldg­
nl,llts uf thl' re!'lIillnship b~l\Veen Gesell/chle and Histurie. Wobberl11in, Geschichte Lind 
[-lis/uric, 4/\ 
127. Buu"el. "['ll~ l\cdl'lIlung del' Persoll Jesu," 292. 
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The dubious character of the New 'T'estaillent wilness raises the ques­
tion of how willing Christians should be [0 entrusl the cert;linty ur their 
faith to the fluctuating results of historical research inlo thal witness. 
Bousset suggests that this question is most pressing for the liberdllhe,)I­
ogy of his day, because, in his estimation, modern liberal theology is ch;\I'­
acterized by a "historically [geschichtlich] conditioned anti-rationJlism" 
that contradicts both Lessing's insistence that accidental hisiuriulilruths 
cannot serve as proof of necessary truths of reilson and Kant's principle ot' 
the illustrative rather than the demonstrative character of hisrory.J28 
By attempting to base faith in the historical person of ksus, wheth­
er from the side of the teaching or gospel of Jesus or from the side or 
his person and the impulse lhat proceeds from him, liberal theology is 
forced to consider the question of historical accur(1cy and reli'lbiliLy. And 
this, Sousset suggests, means that "the looming pOSSibility that perhaps 
we know very little about the personal life of Jesus, so lillie Ih,1I il does 
not present an impressive, vivid picture, must seriously threatell lhdl 
view:"29 
All of the attempts to base the certainty and content of failh in his­
tory are, as Sousset puts it, "oppressed by singular ditnculties." In order to 
move beyond and perhaps overcome these difficulties, faith must seek an­
other foundation, one that is outside of history, That founJation, ROUSSe! 
proposes, is available in reason: 
History [/-listorie], earnestly and vigorously prosecuted, points be­
yond itself and compels us to seek another fOUlllhltion outside of 
history, and that foundation would be reason [Ratio] .... Religioll 
is something innate in human beings, understood 011 the basis of 
the neceSSity of its rational capacity; religion is not borne to hu­
man beings from outside them, thrust upon them from above by 
revelation, and it does not rest on supernatural revelation in the 
specific sense of the word 13u 
Religion, then, is not based in history or in historic events at all. 11 is 
an "original capacity [urspriingliches Vermogen] of the humall being" that 
unfolds within history hut is not based in historyUI By basing religion 
128 Ibid., 293.
 
129 Tbid.,296.
 
130 Tbid, 298.
 
131. Ibid., 298-99. 
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in re,lSon ralher than in history, Bousset has moved religion to the realm 
of ide,ls Ideas, he suggests, do not need the authority of history; rather, 
ide,ls arc Ihe norm by which individual historic personalities and events 
,Ire llle'lsurcd."1 his applies to all historic personalities and events, includ­
ing Ihe person of'Jesus Christ. 
Here, however, is where the "old" rationalism erred, according to 
Boussel.' 'e '1 he old rdtionalism concludes from this series of arguments 
Ih"t history has no medning for religion, that it is merely a crutch that is 
used to raise oneself up to the world of ideas and is then discarded. This 
would he lrue, Boussel suggests, in the realm of science and mathematics. 
But religious ideas Jre not propositions like those of science and mathe­
matics, which are logically demonstrable. Religion, according to Bousset, 
concerns the idea of Ihe meaning and value of existence rSillll und Wert 
des L)useillsj, calegories Ihal Jre completely foreign to scienceUJ 
Trut hs o( science ,1l1d trut hs of rei igion, then, are two fundamentally 
different cLlsses of truth. Science is concerned with the tangible, meaning 
that the Ill,llerial, lhal which persists in space and time, is ultimate truth 
t<)I" science. Religion, on lhe other hJnd, is concerned with ideas. But re­
ligious f"ith does nOI live immediately from ideas, because, according to 
Boussel, ide,lS Jlways remain incomprehensible and ungraspable on their 
own. 'rhey require symbolizJtion to be grasped and comprehended: "the 
worlJ o( elem il y can only become conceivable and objective [gegenstan­
dlichj when Ithese iJeJs] shimmer transparently through the world of 
tillitude. The poet's words contain the Jeepest truth: 'All that is past is only 
J pdrable.'" 1'1 
It is in this sense that history must be understood as significant for 
f<lith In history, nJked ideas are clothed in symbols that convey their 
truth to human beings. In terms of history, too, there is a fundamental 
difference between science and religion. For science, the past always re­
cedes further and further into the distance. II' is, to use Bousset's colorful 
imJge, merely "fertilizer t<)r the future [Diingerfiir die Zukwyi]:'135 But in 
religion (as in art) the past remains alive for the present; the realm of the 
132. BOllssct IlcVcT Ilames .IIlY rq.lrescnlJlives of Ihe "elld ralielnalism." 
133. Ihid., JOO. 
l:\4. IbiLl., J02. 'I he [me! is C,)etbt, and the line ''Alles Vergiingliche ist nllr ~in 
(;kIChllIS" is ('rom tbt' linal chnrlls of the lasl aCI elf Fawl. It is also tht epitaph eln the 
tombstolle ()f tbe poel Klit'l Tucholsky. 
l.l5. tlousset, "Die rkdcutllng <ler Person Jesu," 303. 
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symbolic knows no linear progress: "here preSides the unpredicl'lbililY of' 
the individual, of the genius and the hero."[J" 
In this sense it is possible to speak ofa relalionship between r~lith Jnd 
history. The great religiOUS personalities (of which jesus IS certainly one) 
continue to exert a powerful inHuence in the history of the cOtllnlLlnilies 
that emerged and developed around them. But the signil1cance of these 
personalities is not primarily historic. Theil"Significance is rooted in their 
value as symbols. Bousset suggests that the gre<ll religious pers\)nalities 
not only create the symbols of faith; they themselves becolI/e th<ll symbol 
for the community of faith. So in the case of jesus, he IlOt only cre,lled the 
symbolism of the gospel; he himself became the symbol of Ihe gospel. I (~ 
With this move to consider the symbolic character of religiOUS per­
sonalities, Bousset hopes to have removed the person of jesus from the 
vicissitudes of history and the tluctuations of historical reseJrch. Whell 
Jesus Christ is understood as a symbol rather than as 3 hiSlorical per­
son, the question of history ceases to be the dOlllin<lnt and dominating 
question it has been in the history of modern liberal theology. "I here is 
no longer any need to delineate what might be historically accur,lIe ami 
demonstrable from the later additions of the early Christian comillunity, 
and there is no longer any need to protect faith from the results of histori ­
cal research: 
It comes down to the symbol and the picture itself, not, al this 
point, to ultimate truth and reality. "nlat lies behind the $)'Illools, 
in the immovable, God-given depths of hUlllan reason and in the 
eternal value of ideas. The symbol serves for illustration, not for 
demonstration. Therefore we also make the renlarkable observa­
tion that the picture of Jesus, as his immediate comlllunity pre­
sented it in the gospels, remains and will remain more dfective as 
poetry and truth than as any historical attempts at ('econstruction, 
precise as they might beDS This faith does nOI inLjuire into Ihe 
historic reality in a n.lrrow sense, out into the rc:ligious and the 
morally practical; it stops, consciously or unconsciously, at the 
136. IbiJ. 130usset's Kyrios Christos is partly J~V()teJ 10 an,llyzing Ihe (lIlIic stalliS ",. 
Chrisl, in which dements of the genius anJ the hero are certainly presellt. 
137. Boussel, "Die I3eJelilung Jer Person )csu:' 304. 
138. "Poetry and Trllth" IDichtllng lind WaiJrheitJ is the liile of C"e1h~'s alilohitlg' 
raphy. Bousset was almost certainly awar~ of Ihis conneclion, as he had already ljll()leLl 
Goethe (withollt naming him) earlier in his paper. See Goethe, G,,~tlles Wake, vol. 5, 
Dichtung und Wahrheit rET: Goethe;' Collected Works, vols, 4-5, Fn)}/1 tHy LiJt-I. 
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picture. . And if science were to pronounct: the most extreme 
verdicI Ih,\! ksus did not exist, faith will not be lost, because it 
rt.:st, on it> own intcrnal foun,Laion and, moreover, the pictllre of 
Jcsus in the guspels would nevertheless remain, an,i even ifonly as 
great podry. still as podry of t:ternal symbolic signiticance. 139 
'I he value or the gospels does not rest in their historical veracity but 
in their C,ljldcity poetiol\y and symbolically to convey the "eternal truths 
of faith," And if the gospels are understood in this way, as the product of 
"poelic fantasy" rather than as hislorical documents, then, Bousset be­
lieves, il is ~lill possible [0 confess that "the Logos became flesh and we 
heheld his glt)ry.",·,ll 
Kous~C1 hopes 1'0 have removed faith from the vicissitudes of his­
torical re:-oe,lrch by completely removing the basis of faith from history, 
estahlishing it in reaSon instead, There might be a historic basis of faith 
t)r there might not; the qUestiOll of historiciry is irrelevant. What matters 
mosr is the power of the symbol of JesUS ChrisI' to convey what Bousset 
calls the "eternal truths of faith." the symbol of Jesus Christ exerts a 
pUlverful influence in the Christian tradition, and it is this symbol that 
serves as t he basis of fairh, There is an underlying truth, but by itself it is 
incumprehellsible. It requires poetic, symboliC representation in order to 
be understood. 
1"01' l)ousset, then, faith is not dependent on history at all. It is, as 
he candidly admits, a m,llter of faith resting on its own internal, rational 
found<llion. Kousset has removed faith from the vicissitudes of history, 
but he h<ls m'lde faith its own product, a move that is difficult to defend as 
somehow remaining true to the Protestant tradition,l~1 He seeks to avoid 
the prohlem of faith and history altogether by turning to a rational foun­
d,ltion for faith. in the tradition of, for example, Lessing, Kant, and Jakob 
Friedrich Fries. 'll And while his solution does make faith completely in­
dependent of the results of historical research, it will not be a satisfactory 
solution to the prohlem of faith and history for those who still want to 
have some historic basis for faith. 
13<) ~ousscl, "I)ie Bedeutung Jcr Person!esu," 305. 
140 Ihld. 
I_II. To he: (air, tloussel n<ver daillls thai h~ is allelllpting to JdellJ a specifically 
I'rokS\;lIl1 undcrsldllding nr railh. 
142. 'Ihese arc Ihe Ihree ligures wholll l30USSel acknolvleJges as influencing his own 
thought <Jil the ralionall'olll1dation 01' religioil, Ibid., 2<)')-300 
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Wobbermin's Appraisal and Critique of Bousser's Position 
Like Bousset, vVobbermin is concerned to remove the basis of faith from 
the vicissitudes of historical research, Unlike Bousset, he is not willing to 
divorce faith completely from any historic foundat ion. All ofWohberll1in's 
criticisms of ROUSSel's position are based on one fundamental concern, 
namely the lack of terminological precision when discussing history and 
historical research. Bousset uses the terms gt:schidlflidl and hislorisch 
interchangeably, and Wobbermin attributes many of his own misgivings 
to this lack of terminological precision in Bousset's paper. The question 
of whether Bousset himself might admit the possibility of greater clarity 
by means of such a distinction is left unasked. For Wobbermin. Bousset's 
position would be much improved were such a distinction (onsistently 
employed. 
Wobbermin agrees with Bousset that the results of historicll re­
search cannot serve as the basis of faith. To claim to do so is to give up 
the security of faith from the outset. W Wobbermin further agrees th,1!' 
the historical [historisch] can never serve as a foundation because it is by 
nature always secondary, never pri1llary,I~~ But Bousset also cl,linls th,]t 
faith cannot be based on the historic [geschichtlich) appearance of]e:-ous of 
Nazareth,l~5 Where Bousset wants to deny the possibility of basing f"ith 
on either the results of historical research or the historic appearance of 
Jesus of Nazareth, Wobbennin wants to make a distinction between these 
two pOSSibilities. As Wobbermin puts it: 
To lVant to entrust the security of our faith to historicll rest:,Hch b 
for me an absolutely senseless undertaking, For that means noth­
ing other than to give up the security ofthis faith al the outset. But 
on the "historic appearance ofJesus of Nazareth" - more precisely 
put: on the historic picture of the person of Jesus Christ, on the 
picture of the person of ]t:sus Christ as history presents it to us in 
order to establish faith, that appears 10 me, then, absolutt:ly to be 
warranted, ifone does not understand this picture of the perSt)11 of 
Jesus Christ as separate and unrelated to our own spiritual life, bUI 
143. Wobbermin, Gesd/;ehle lIlId f-listorie, 50. 
14-1. "DlIs Hislor;sehe kal/ll IItI/1/oglich als ellvas FWlIllIlllelll<l/es gelleJi, de/lll es is/ 
njehts Primares, som/em etll1as dlln:hallS SekwlIfiires." Ibid" 51. 
145. BOUSSd, "Die l3edeulung der Person !esu," 291-92. 
67 
L\ITJ-I XI TilE INTERSECTION OF HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE 
rather lJlcciscly in its relation to thiS our own srirituallife and in 
ils signilicdncc for il. llo 
Aga In, Wobbc:r111 in is concerned to establ ish the continu ity of the 
historic flillure of Christ with its efficacy persisting in and through his­
lory Ihe dhc .1CY of th is !lic'l me will persist regard less of historical inqui ry 
inln its l)rigins, alld its value [IVerl] is based precisely on the fact that it 
willll<:?rsi,st, regardless of the results of historical inquiry into its origins, 
'Ihe v~due of lhe f'idure of Christ lies in its dependence on Geschichte, 
speciflc.lily that it 1)((lVeS itselfro he historically [geschidillich] efficacious, 
And this historic ef]iCdCY also proves that the picture is not merely the 
product nf what Bllussel called "poetic fantasy."I.I~ 
Bolh Bnusset ~\I1d \:Voblwrmin agree that historical research cannot 
l'rovide lhe fnUlld~ltion for failh, but they disagree on what should pro­
vide Ih.1t Itllll1dation. I)ausset suggests that faith linds its foundation in 
redson, whereas Wnbber1l1in suggests thelt the foundation is furnished by 
C;cschic!Jlt.: CIS distinct frol11 J-/islorie) "in its significelnce for the personal 
life 01 failh."I'~ Wobberl11in is unwilling to follo\v Sousset in securing 
I.J(). "/\'1' IlisliJrisl !Jell Forscllllllg die Sidlerlleit IlIlseres G/alliJells allvertri.1llen IVoI· 
I~II, dl/; iSI iiir lIIidl ""I sdda!Jtllill silllllvs~s UIII~rII~f1l11ell. Dellll das heiJ]! gar nichts 
AIll./'Tes, dis ",<' St, Ita!Jci! di~ses G"III/'ells VVII vomhereill pr~isgebeJl. Allf die 'geschic!Jtli­
cite frsdlt'lllllllg kSIl "Oil N,,:"rcth' - gUll/ller gesprvc!Jell: aufdas geschichtliche PersolliJi/d 
kSII Cllrisll, "lIrtl"s P,:r;oll!III" 0'011 Jesils C!Jrist/ls, wic es 11115 die Geschicflte zeigt, dell 
C;/<lII/J,," :11 griilll/ell, .l"s >clteillt lIIir "II II II dllrc!JallS berec!Jtigt, wellil IJILlII dies PersOJlbiid 
1'011 JCSJl.' Oil i.<tllS lIidIl <lI>!!t'SOll"ert jill' sidl 111/1./ I>ezidlLlIIgslos Jap/' ohlle BeziellLlIIg allf 
1I11)t.'" t';~('lIej Gci:>{e;ddJCll, :>Vl/ciC1"1l genuie ill jelllt:,. Bf!zichUllg auf dieses IOljer eigenes 
G~iSI('sl""cll '"111 ill scilla Be"elltllllgflir dasse/be." \'Vobbcrmill, G~scllichte IlIld Historie, 
50 
147. .AI this \-,nilll Ilmust be said Ihat\-,erha\-,s \oVobbermin has missed BOllssds \-,oinl. 
1""lSoCI (\alilis Ihal thc sYlllb,,1 tIl' Christ as the \-,rodlici or \-,oetic fantasy rcmains the 
Illc.lIlS by whic'h the <.:lcrnal truths of faith arc c<1nveyeLi tu human beings. vVobbcrrnill 
LI"c, not \-,ut the dlicacy "I' Ihe \-'iLture uf Christ in terms of eternal truths immediatel)' 
,I\'ailabk to rcao"n, but re(ers t" the dficacy uf the \-,icture of Christ within history as 
the c'nduring value or the \-,idurc. Bnth Wobbermin and Bousset arrive at the same goal 
(n11l1 diilcrcnt starting poillts. Yet Wobbermin insists that hi:; goal cannot be reached 
through a pr"duct o( poetic LlIliasy, that hisllHic etilcacy is \-'roof that the picturc is not 
Ih~ product of ['oelK fantasy but of a histuric ligure. It is difficult to see ho;v this is a valid 
,1rgulllCIlt against Iloussct, or h,,,v historic efficacy /JIliSt have its origin in a historic figure 
rather than In pOdry or sylllb,,1. 
14X. "/),/; LlIlda~ Flillt/wlleill liej~rt die Gesc!Jichte. Die Geschicilte nallilieh, wie diesel' 
Be)!riJF dllrdl ,"~ 1J~\I"U.ite Ulltersciteidllllg VO/JI Begrij!" del' Histurie Iliiller bestillllllt wirel. 
Di"s~ G~sdlidlle in iltra Bedeut/lng pir Jus persollliche G/aulJensleben ist oder liefert das 
1I0lige Flllltti/IlIt:llt." Ibid., 5:>-56 Wobhermin dlso suggests that this is the beginning of 
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the foundation of faith in reason because, in his estimation, Sausset has 
inverted the proper relationship between reason and Gescllidlte. While 
Sousset subordinates Geschichte to reason, Wobbermin insists that rca· 
son must be subordinated to Geschieflte, 
According to Wobbermin, reason must be: subordinated to (,'eschid'ie 
because human reason is only exercised and developed within GesLhid,/c 
and is therefore necessarily dependent on it. i(eason exists and functions 
only within the realm of GeschiLhte precisely because hUilldn beings are 
historic subjects standing within GeschiLhte. To rationalize religion - to 
remove it from the realm of Gesdlichte and to place it above and beyond 
Geschichte - is to give it up, because religion is irreducibly hisloric. I "" 
Geschichte, not reason, is the realm of religious trUl h. for \:Vobberm in, 
the historic character of the Christian religion is rooted in the Ilis/oriL 
picture of Jesus Christ as its creative: source. Sousset prefers to sl)edk or 
the symbol of Christ as the creative source of the Christian religion. '1 he 
person of Christ, he sugge:sts, transcends mere hisloricity and creates a 
living symbol that is "more effective as poelry and truth" [h'1I1 as a his­
toric figure. The symbol of Christ, according to Sousset, illustrates the 
ultimate truth and reality lying behind the symbol. He paraphr<1ses Kant 
to make precisely this point: "the symbol serves for illustration, not for 
demonst ration,"lso 
Wobbermin also appeals to Kant's proposition to illake his case 
against Sousset's rationalization of religion, but he makes one import~lnt 
addition. Kant suggested that the" Hiitorisclle" does nOl serve for 1he 
demonstration, but for the illustration of truth. lSI Wabbermin revises 
Kant's dictum to read, "Geschichte does not serve for a demonstration or 
religiOUS truth, nor merely for its illustration; Geschichte serves ttlr the 
his religio-psychological method, which hc will develop rnure fully in Ilis threc·volliine 
systematics (see Cha\-,ter 3, "Systematic Thcology according 10 the Religiu-I's),chuluglcal 
Method"). 
149. Wobbermin, Gescllicrtte ulld Historie, 64. 
150. Bousset, "Die Bedeutung del' Person ksu:' 305. 
151. Kant's original propOSition refers to the role of the historical in relating trulh: 
"The historical [das Historische] serves only for illustratillll, not fill' den!lln'lratiull." 1'01' 
the original pro\-,osition, see Kant, Luse Bliilter aliS Kants Nach/ajJ, 3:66 [ET: Nutes 111111 
Fragmelltsj, In the third volume of his systematics, Wobberlllin sllgg.:slS thal, I<H K'\I1t, 
dCiS Historische signifies Geschichte itself and not merely historical research. Wobbennin, 
Systematisehe Theologie n<lch rdigiorlspsych%gischer Methode, vol. 3, Hb~n lind WIIl,rl,eit 
des Christellllmls, 30S, n. I. 
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itll'elliio/l of religious truth:';-" For Wobberlllin it is Geschichle, not rea­
SOil, Ihd( is Ihc essential ,1nd permanent condition for the acquisition of 
rcligiou~ Irulh, bolh because ,111 truth is essentidlly historic and because 
hUlll,1I1 bcings Jnd religion itself are irreducibly historic: 
'1 his ~)i<lllrc of je,us Christ as ,1 hisloric figure is the norn1 and 
nut l11el'cly thc symhol of the Christian religion. It does not serve 
111<.:I·cly lUI' Ihe illustl"llion of Christian faith in Cod. It serves for 
ils inVcl1tiul1 Jnd indeed in ,1 double res~)eet: it serves faith for its 
pl'JltiL'al r<.:ligiuus life of faith as the way to the living Cod, and 
it scrvcs theology for its theologic:al work as the I11dhodologic:al 
I11C,1nS of a l110rc ~)rccise defi nit ion of the Ch rist ia n idea of God. 
lillie-cd nol '10 ,1 doglllillic confession, hut also not only as a 
~)l'llduCI ut I)Odic t'anlasy, hut rathel' as a confession of faith thdt 
s<.:cks and finds lhe reveLltion of Cod in history do we adopt the 
words: '1 he l.ogus becdille flesh alld we beheld his glory. Yes, we 
nuy 'ldopt it t:\'cn 1110re wholeheartedly and say: 1he Logos be­
C,1I11~ Ilt'sh ;1I1d we 'IdIOt" his glory. lei.' 
()J} the bi1Sis of his conclusion, it is cledr that Wobberlllin is not will­
ing to give lip Ihe im~)ortance of divine revelation in history in favor of a 
purely rational or symbolic foundation for faith. And this is the primary 
dilference bdween his position and Bousset's, despite many important 
similarities. Houssct is willing to give up revelation as a historic event, 
while Wobbermin insists that to give up historic revelation is to give up 
the Christi.lIl religion. So in spite of many similarities, which Wobbermin 
152. "Die Gexllidl/c dielll zwelr /lic/'t WI' DelilU/lslmtioll der re/igiosen Wuhrheil, 
u/Jcr sic ,lielll ,mcrl /li( III 1,1<~! ZII ilIra IIlIIstmlioll; die Ceschidl/e ,/ie/ll zurlllvelltioll der 
rdigiiisell Wullrlleil." VVllhh~lI11in, GeschiLhle IIJ1d f-Jislorie, 70. Emphasis mine. It is inter· 
~slillg Ihat Wllhhcrillin C!WllSCS III usc th~ English word "Invention" here r<llher than the 
(;crlll,ln'Tlfilldullg." 
153. "So i." dieS Bild JeSII ChriSli "Is geschie!l/iidle Gro/!e die Nurlil IIl1d lIichl bloj! 
dil; Symbol (Ia e!lIisllidlCJI Religion. Es dieJlI lIichl bluf! wr IIIlIslm!ioll des chrisllichell 
COllcsgll/l//lells. Es diclI! 311r IlIveJIlioJl dessdbell 1111(1 zwar dies ill doppeller Hinsichl: dem 
CI<llIllell /iiI' s,iJl pmklise!l·r"hgioses G/ullbellslebeJl als Weg ZIIJ1'/ lebelldigell Call selbsl, 
der Theolosie .fill' dll'e theologische ArlJeil als lJIet!w,}isches !'''fillet der Ni:i/'erbeslinlJlIlIlIg 
des (/lrist/ie!lell GollesgeduJlkens. ZWl/r nid'l als doglllatise!res Bekelltltllis, abel' allch nichl 
11111' als Er:ellgJlis die/llerisc/ler PIII/JlIl/sie, sUllderll als Bekel/Jllllis des die OJ}imbarl/l/g 
C,llles ill der Ces(/I/e!lIe Sl/dlemlell Lll/d filldellell ClaLibells, eigJlell wir Llns das Worl all; 
Del' Logos w"rd I''/eisch lIIlll wir s(,llell sellie Herdic/lkeit. Ja wir diil/ell es Ul1S )Judi n·ick· 
h,ill/user alleigl/ell Wid sLigell: Da Logos ward FleiSch ///111 wir sehell seille Herrlichkeit." 
Ihid, 72. 1-:mph,lslo in original. 
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himself acknowledges, he is unwilling to follow Bousset's rational ;Ip­
proach to secure a faith above the shifting results othistorical research. 
After an extensive engagement with these fO!lr ligures - Lessing, 
Kahler, Herrmann, and Bousset - vVobberl11in hop"s that his own posi­
tion has become clearer with respect to the problelll of faith and history. 
He indicates that his own position lits somewhere between Kiihler's and 
Herrmann's. This is consistent with his intention to lIlaillt.lin a historic 
foundation for Christian faith, as opposed to the ra:iollalist alld dlltihis­
torical tendencies of Lessing's and Bousset's positicl1s. Now lhal hc has 
determined where he stands vis-a-vis similar positions frolll the ~)dS(, he 
next turns his attention to a constructive sketch of his OWII position on 
the problem of faith and history. 
THE HISTORIC PICTURE OF /ESUSCHRIST 
In a 19] 1 essay entitled "Psychologie und Erkennlni,kritik der religii)sen 
Erfahrung:' Wobbermin emphasizes the historic chanCIer of Ihe eh rist idn 
religion and seeks to deline Christianity in its relation to Ge5chicllte and 
in opposition to Historie: 
Certainly genuine religion must be completely anJ unconditioil­
ally free vis-ii-vis every merely historical tradition (ie., tr<ldilion 
comprehensible only by means of historical rt:seard1), and it llluSt 
therefore grant such research unconditional and :omplete fr<::e­
dam. But this is not to say thai the link that immed dtely conn~cts 
religion with Gesdlichle itself must be severed. R.ther, this link 
may not be severed if religion itself is not 10 he harned in its mosl 
proper essence. 
For a relation to Geschichle helongs to the continued existence 
of every genuine and healthy religion .... And in ChristiJnity the 
relation to Gt:schichle is concentrated in the picture J[ ksus Christ 
as it radiates outward toward us from the New Testamenl, as it is 
available and comprehensible to every religiOUS experience inde­
pendent of all historical criticism of the tradition. IS­
\54. "Cewi}] J1I//fl eehte Religion geg<!lIiiber allee blufl hislori;e!lol d.h. II//r liIit dell 
lvlille/n hislorischer ForschuJ1g .fLlflharen Oberliefer//ng gallz //J/l/llllliedillgi frei seill IlIld 
sie nlllfl also sole'l,er FursehLlng IlJIhedillgle IlJId vollige Freih<!il ://;<?SIe!,<!II. Aller dWllil 1;1 
dodl lIicht gesagl, du/3 a//ch dus die Religiull mit der Goschichle se/bsl IIJlmillellillr verklliip­
!ende Band zersdlnill<!n werdell rIl//fl. Vie/meltr dar! dies Bandllh)11 zersc!lIIillell werel<!JI, 
weJ1n niehl die Religion seibsl ill ihrem eigenslell Wesen verlelzl lVerdell sull. Dellll eille 
Beziehl/ng wr Cesehiehte gehorl eben zwn B<!slallde aller echten Ill/I! gesllJldell Re/igioJl 
hillZll. Ulld im ChristenlWrl kOILzelllriert sich die Bezie!llIllg ,/II' ueselLiclLle ill delJl 
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Wllbbermin admits that this position is otten misunderstood, espe­
ci,lIly in terl1ls of the role or historical criticism. He argues for the unre­
strickd access of historiul! criticism to the Christian tradition, including 
the pici ur~' or jesus eh rist (ou nd in the New Testament. However, if th is 
picture is lo be ,lVail,lble and COl11l)rehel1sible to religious experience, it 
Illust be ill some sense also iml1lediately available, without first being 
provided by historical research. The New Test,llnent picture of Christ 
must be subjected 10 rigorous historical criticism, both in order to strip 
aw,ly ,lilY false sllPIHlrtS (or faith and to allow the effects or efficacy of that 
picture to shine thruugh the tradition 'lnd become immediately available 
10 religiou~ experience. It is specifically the erred or efficacy of this picture 
for religious experience that is independent of historical research and 
rel1laillS ull<llfelled by it. 
Here WobberJlli n's impl icit d ist inct ion between effect or efficacy and 
f-lis/or;e becol1les vilally illlportant. Historical research can uncover or 
rew,lI Ihe dfecls or etticacy of the New Testament picture o( Christ, but 
Wohhennill insists that these effects are not thereby made the product 
of histmic,lI rese,lrch 'Ille eti~cts or erncacy of the picture remain prior 
,lJ1d superior to flij/orie, which serves onl)' the purpose of uncovering or 
reve,lling the elleds so that they are immediately available to religious 
experience. 
Wobbermin's three "essenti'll elements" of the historic picture of 
Christ (an serve as ,1 test case for this theory. Each of the three essential 
eleillenls - Christ's ethical disposition toward love, his unity of will with 
his heavenly rather, 'lnd his elevation to the Father following his SUffering 
and death, along with the el-fects or efficacy of these elements in the pres­
ent - exist prior [0 historical criticism of the New Testament texts, but it is 
only by l1le,lnS of historical research that these three elements are isolated 
from the remainder of the biblical picture of Christ. lss 
I3llde \"011 /e:;lI:; Cllri:;/u:;, !Vie e:; /III:; aLI:; dem Nellell Teslamelll elllgegellieLichtet Lind wie 
<':; 1/1lCJ!-IJllillgig "Oil all.:r hisrurischell Kritik del" Ollerliefertlll!5 jeder religio:;el! ErJilhnmg 
2I1gc:illg/1I h IIl1LlJu{;/wr i:;/." Wobbernlil1, "Psycbologie UI1J Erk~nl1ll1iskrilik Ja religiose 
hfahrul1!S," 3-l~. 
155. Ihis, Ihel1, i, why Wohhermil1 Call1101 dgree with Kilhler th,1I the historic Christ 
Cd1111<>1 he sq.JJraled (rom Ihe biblicdl piclur~ o( him. The results of historical illv~sti­
gdli\1I1 of Ihe Ne\v "I"<:'I,\l11eI11 lexlS lil1dlly J~mand such a Jistinction, in 'vVobbermin's 
opinl\)J1. 
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The significance of the picture of Christ for religiOUS experience is 
determined by religious experience itself 1io Historical reseclrch cannot 
detract from the value of this picture because the relationship between 
the historic figure of Christ and individual religiOUS experience is primar­
ilya historic, not historical, relationship. 1l1is relationship exists prior to 
historical inquiry into that picture and does not depelld on lhe results 
of that inquiry for its value, It does not helve to do with ,1 historically 
[hijtorisch] questionable figure from the past, but with a historic ligure 
that is active and efficacious in the present: "For religious experience, the 
New Testament picture of Christ is an illlmediately given historic ligure; 
it maintains its value and its reality through its ejti:cI on the moral-reli­
gious life.",;7 
Again, the decisive question in this context is how this historic pic­
ture of Christ is defined in order for it to remain independent of historic11 
criticism. vVobberlllin suggests that individual eveMs and statemellts ill 
the life of Jesus must be subjected to historical criticism, but thM the over­
all impression, the main and decisive traits of the picture (and therefore 
its effect or efficacy), are those stressed by the entire New Testament ,lnd 
which therefore are a result of the power of the historic figure of ChriSt 
himself, These main and decisive traits are the three "essential elements" 
uncovered or revealed by historical research of the New Testamen[ texts. 
The third trait is the most significant for Wobbermin, and it is rhis 
trait that most clearly disti nguishes his posil ion from Herrmann's, for ex­
ample. The resurrection belongs to the essential picture of Christ both be­
cause Christian faith is always Easter faith in the risen Christ 'lild because 
the resurrection is the basic presupposition of the entire New Testamenl. 
There are many important historical considerations to be taken inro ac­
count, most importantly whether the resurrection can be considered a 
historical event at all. Wobbermin does not answer this queslion in his 
early work and only discusses this aspect of the question much later, in 
156. Th is is lhe beginning of Ihe so-call~J "rdigio- psyc!ln\ngical circle" I,.eli~iulI:;!,:;)'­
chologischer Zirkel], which will be discllss~d in Il1nlT Jetail in Ibe nexi c!ldpler. 
157. "Fiir die religio:;e Erfahrung ;:;1 das neukslamellllic!-Je CllrisI1l51>i"/ oille 1/llIlIillel­
bar gegebene ge:;chiclaliche Gro{Je; sie bewiilirt ihren Wert und ihre Wirkli(ilkeil (.Iurdl i1m' 
Wirku/lg af/fda:; sittlich-religio:;o Leben." Emphasis mine. Wobhermin (urtha argues Ih<ll 
this effecI on the moral-religiOUS lilt: is Ihe firsl dnJ 1ll0,t il11fJOrldnl crilerion (or evalu­
ating th~ N~w Teslamenl piclure of Christ from a religious fJersfJ~clive. Wobberl11in, 
Ce:;chichce rend Historie, 75-76. 
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his syslem"l ic Ihcnlogy_l ,,' In Cesdlidlte Lind f-/istorie his primary concern 
is to ,-iJrify the esselltia\ traits of the historic picture of Christ found in 
the New TcstJn1ent. 
Ilut there is a more basic question that IIlUSt be raised in relation to 
lhe historic 11iclure of Christ. namely. is it true? 'vVobbermin treats this 
problem in three p,lns: tirst. ill terIllS of the actual question of truth; sec­
ond. in terllls of I he question of the historic re,dity of the person of jesus 
Chrisl; ami Ihird. in lerms of the question of historicity or of historical 
com prehcnsi bi lit y. I;" 
Is the New Testament picture of jesus Christ actually true? The reli­
gious interest ill the picture of Christ is cOllcerned ouly with truth in the 
slridesl, uitilllate sense. i.e_, ,1S eternal truth. It is not primarily a question 
oflrulh as posed inlhe realm ofscientihc knowledge. which understands 
truth in krllls of the highest possible probelbility. Relther, truth in this 
case is ,1n .expression of the conviction of faith thelt the picture of Christ is 
Cod's st:lf-I-evelalion. 'I helt the picture of Christ rq1resents and embodies 
the sdf-reveldtion of Cod is always d conviction of faith, never of histori­
cal klwwledge. lw 
'I he decisive question for 'vVobbermin is the question of value, spe­
cilicdlly the value of Ihis conviction of faith for the moral-religious life,lol 
'the Christian world view is essentially and characteristically an ethical 
world view becduse it hnds its ground and basis in a personal, ethical God 
who is revealed in the person of jesus Christ. This conviction raises the 
second, eC]u<llly decisive question of the historic reality of the picture of 
Christ 1:01' Christiall faith the question of the reality of the picture of 
Christ is !lot silllply collapsed into the question of its historicity or its 
historical comprehensibility- The key to this question is the central role of 
religious experience in Christi<ln faith: 
I:m faith, the decisive: criterion for the unique historic reality of 
!t'sus Christ is the fad that the corresponding conviction of faith. 
158. Wohhcrlllill, WeSeli /./rlll W"hrheit, 280fl'. 
IS'!. Wohbcrlllill. Ge,dl;ehk 111/1/ Hi,lorie. 77-78. 
16(). 'I his rccalls Wubberl11ill's criticisl11 of I.~ssing's dislinctiun between contingent 
and nccessary Iruths, parliculal"iy Wubberlllin's insistence that Irutb has an irreducibly 
ckl'llal character. Unforlun,ltdy neither there nor here does he offer an aJeljuate defini­
lion of Clt'rnJllruth. 
161. Ibid., 78ft'. II is" ljl1CSlion rdaleJ to his IhirJ Jdinition of Gesehiehte, as the 
inkrrd"l](1I10f hUl11an bein~s as spiritual-nwral beings in their devdopment. 
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as it finds expreSSion in cOl1ll1lunion with the exalted Lord, is the 
surest and most effective guarantee for the truth of the picture 01' 
Christ as the revelation of God, However, this is indef1endent of 
the question of the historical comprehensibility of the person of 
jt'sus Christ. 16~ 
Finally, for Wobbermill the questioll of historicity is uitilllcliely il'­
relevant. It can be answered altirl1\cltivdy or'negatively Oil the I-usis of 
historical research. but it cannot serve as the bc1sis for faith. Faith would 
cease to be faith were il based solely on the results of hist'orical resecll',-h. 
Although Wobbennill does Ilot put it ill such terlllS, (here is here a dis­
tinction between the Illan jesus of Nazclreth behilld the lexts of the Nell' 
Testelment and the New Testament picture of him. The Illan jesus of 
Nazareth behind the New Testament texts is a shadowy hgure dnd call be 
known only by historical research (and even then very little can be known 
with any certainty), He becomes the historical jesus of modertl biogra­
phy and historical research. The historic picture of Christ. as il confronts 
Christians in and from the New Testalllent, is the Christ of r~lilh. 'rh"l 
picture ultimately transcends the historical existence of jesus ofNaLareth. 
Faith is not primarily interested in the man jesus of Nazareth; faith is 
primarily interested in the three "essential elements" of the picture of the 
historic Christ (particularly their effects and efticacy) hclllded down in the 
New Testament and the Christian tradition, 
According to Wobbel'lnin. Christian faith could withstand a negdlive 
answer to the question of the historical existence of jesus o( Nazareth be­
cause faith is Ilot ultimately concerned with l-listorie, but with Gesclliclltt.:. 
As he puts it, "the historicity - the historical comprehenSibility - of jesus 
is not an essential presupposition for the truth of the New Testament 
picture of Christ at all."163 A faith that is b,1sed 011 the results of histori­
cal research into the question of the historicity of jesus - whether lhal 
historicity is altirmed or denied - ceases to be faith: 
162. "Oem GIlllllJeli isl dn; ell(,cheidende Kritaill/I/ Ii.ir die ge,ell/chr/idle 
Einzelwirkliehkeil jesLi Christi da Ul/l,land, dalJ die ellt,<prechel/de G/III//,el/;iiiJerzcll1!lIl/g, 
wie ;ie ;ich im Verkehr mil dem erlJohten Ham AlIsdfllek \'er;L!I<l{f1, die ,iel,er;!e IIl/d 
wirkllngskrdftigsle Biirgscliaft ji'ir die Wahrheil de; Christllsui/des ,II; da 0tlel/lNlrllllg 
GOlles isl. Oa; isl aua Lll/ahhiil/gig von del' Fruge IIC/eh Lia histori,L!,el/ FCljJlwrkeir der 
Persoll fesLi Christi." Ibid., 80. 
163. "Del/II 1I1/1ilngiillgliche VOTallS;elzwlg fiir die Wulirheit de, lIellte,ral1lwlliL!,el/ 
ChrislLlSbi/des i,l die Hi,torizitdt - die histori;che Fup/Jarkeit - je;1I itbaliClllfJl lIidll." 
Ibid,84, 
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'Ill duubt the: hist(l['icity of jesus signifies historical arbitrariness. 
'1 he question of the historicity of jesus may and must be' affirmed 
\\'ith the best histlHical conscience. 
BUI I l1lay Ihlt and will not base l1ly faith on the affirmative 
albWC[' tl) this question. For then it rests on l11y historical under­
standing And faith would cease to be faith if it ",ere based on 
historicalulll!e[·st,lIlding. 
'lilliS, If nec'essary, f'lith would also be able CJll1lly to accert a 
ncgativc ,lnswer to the question of the historicity of jesus Christ. 
It ,/ucs Ilui sllllld or!,iI/ 011 Ille IIffinliulive or lIegaiive UI1SIVer io this 
(/lies/i(}II.I"~ 
'I he only legitimate historical question in this matter, as vVobbermin 
sees it, is the question of the Christian tradition itself. Christian Faith can 
trdce itselF odck to the hrst Christi8ns and throughout its history con­
sistently refers 10 d historic personality. Because the historicity of Jesus 
uf NdDlI'eth is neither historically comprehenSible nor theologically rel­
eVdnl, according to 'vVoboerll1in, the question oFthe unbroken succession 
of Christian sclf-cnnsciollsness leading back to the first Christians, in 
which lile New Testdl11ent picture of Christ remains immediately present 
allLl aVdilable to religious experience, becomes the decisive question. But 
it is lhe questinn of Ceschichte, not of Historie, that is finally decisive for 
Christidn fdith: 
I ()~. "Die Ili,{('rt:iliil jesli Z/I "ezweiJelll, bedeLitel 11I51Ori,che \Nil/kiir. Die Frage lI<.Icll 
cia rt/jl""izi/'~I je511 dUlf II lid IIlllp lIlillie;leilI h/5luri5chelll Cewi,5eII !iejelhl werdell. Aber 
lIleiliCII G/i/II/'\'1I cI'lIf WId will iell allf die Beil1hlllIS die5er Frage lIicht griinJell, Deml 
sie IJentll! Illlf lIl\'iller 11I5lurisel,elI EilISiellt. Ulld der Clewbe wiirde au/horell, C/i/llbe zu 
5eilI, welllI or 'lUI' Ilisluri5e1le Eillsichl gegriilIdet wiirde. Also wiirde der Glaube auell die 
\'el'lleilIIllig cia Fmge 1It/c!1 der I-hsloriziliil je;u CilrUi segebellelIfaL/s rltllig hilIlIellmell 
kiilIlIeli. Er ;Ie/,I IiIl1i )LillI lIiehl lIlit der l3eji/I/lllIg oder Vemeilll/llg die;er Fnlge:' IbiJ" 
81. Fillph'lsis III origin,d. In light of [his alnrmatioll of the ultimate irrelevance of the 
hi,toric,ll comprehensibil it I' of the existence of Jesus of Nazareth anJ whal thai means or 
docs [WI meall for Christian f,lith, \Nobbermin's criticisms of Drews come into sharper 
focus. While Ilrews clJlKludeJ from the h[storical incomprehensibility of Jesus thaI he 
did not exi'l '11 all, Wobbcrrnin concludes from the perspective anJ the presuppositions 
of Christiall faith Ihat the histl1ricit)' of Jesus is not the primar)' yuestion. The primary 
quc'stioll [s the e!licacy of the New Testaillent picture of Christ, <InJ thaI question must 
[lot bc' coliapscJ into the ljucstilHl of historical comprehensibility. Drewsalld 'vVobberrnin 
both agrec that the existence Ill' jesus of Nazareth can[1\11 be JemonstrateJ with absolute 
certainly by historical rc'carch, but they Jisagree on what thai Illeans for Christian faith. 
AnJ th,lt " the impor[anl qUt'stiO[I, atieasl for YVobberrnin. 
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For the Christian religion is that religion, thaI form 01 highest 
phase of religious life, which caille i!lto existence under the im­
pression of the picture of the person of jeSllS Christ and which has 
its permanent norm in just this piclure of the [)erson,d and salvilic 
life of Jesus Christ, the norm namely for its individual forms of 
embodiment as well as the norl1l for its historic deve!opmcn1. 1o; 
It is this question of th~ relationship between the historic piLlure of 
Christ and personal religiolls experience that will occupy Wobbermin for 
the better part of his career. l11e distinction between Ges,-hic!lle, /-/istlllie, 
and WirkLtng or Wirks£1l11keit serves as the foundation of the religio, 
psychological method that he developed in his three-volume s)'Slem,llic 
theology and defended in a series of Streilsc!lrifrell directed against Karl 
Barth and dialectical theology. It is to this method, and more specifically 
to what Wobbeflnin called the "religio-psychological circle:' tildl we now 
turn. 
165. "De til I die christ/iche Religiun ist diejellige Religioll, dieienige Foml oder St/lfe/lJ/(jho 
religiiisen Lebens, die /In/a de/'ll Eindruck des Persollbi/des jes/I Chn;1 i olltsl£ll/deli isl 111111 
an eben diesem BiLde des Pasol/' II/'Id Hei/al/dslelJetls je;u Christi ihre hle//Jel/lle NOI'II1 h<ll, 
Jie Norm niillllich fiir illre illdivid/le/lel/ Au;gesta/tulIgsforllletl sOll'ie die Norm (fir tI,re 
geschichtliclle Elitwick/wig" Ibid" 86. 
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